

JONTHISTORIC WARCOUNCIL-SHIVAJI

BACKGROUND GUIDE

LETTER FROM THE SENAPATI (EXECUTIVE BOARD)

Issued from Fort Rajgad, 20th day of Jyeshtha, Shaka Samvat 1587 (1665 CE)

To the Esteemed Sardars, Commanders, and Members of the Shivaji War Council,

As the sun rises over the Sahyadri, casting its golden light on the blood-stained soil of the Deccan, we stand on the brink of one of the most defining moments in Swarajya's history the impending confrontation at Purandar. The Mughals, under the command of Raja Jai Singh I of Amber, are marching upon our forts, determined to crush the flame of Hindavi Swarajya lit by Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj.

In these crucial hours, you have been summoned to the War Council to advise, deliberate, and prepare. The honour of the Maratha dharma, our forts, our swarajya, and our people rest upon the decisions we now take.

This Council shall operate under the authority of Maharaj Shivaji, guided by the war principles laid down in the ancient **Arthashastra**, the martial dharma of the **Shiv Dharmasutras**, and the Rajniti doctrines inherited from the Satavahanas and Yadavas of Devagiri.

The decisions made here — in this sabha of senapatis, fort commanders, intelligence chiefs, logistics officers, and naval captains — will determine the fate of Purandar and of Bharatmata's children.

This background dossier has been prepared to aid your strategies. It draws exclusively upon records from the Government of Bharat, reflecting our glorious past with historical data, fort blueprints, army rolls, and diplomatic transcripts recovered and preserved by the National Archives of India and the State Gazetteers of Maharashtra.

Come, let us rise to the challenge. Let us fight with honour, with strategy, and with the blessing of Bhavani Devi.

Jai Bhavani. Jai Shivaji.

- By Order of the Royal Council, Fort Rajgad

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE BATTLE

Background to the Battle of Purandar (1665)

The Battle of Purandar refers to the military confrontation that led to the Treaty of Purandar signed between Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj and Mirza Raja Jai Singh I of the Mughal Empire in June 1665. It was not a single pitched battle but a strategic siege, conducted by the Mughal Empire as part of a larger imperial campaign to crush Shivaji's rising power in the Deccan.

This moment marks a turning point in the Maratha resistance against the Mughals and showcases Shivaji's diplomatic brilliance, strategic retreats, and commitment to securing the long-term sovereignty of his swarajya.

Official Timeline (as per Gazetteers and National Archives of India)

Year Key Event

1659 Shivaji defeats Afzal Khan at Pratapgad (Gazetteers Vol. IV, p. 112)

1660 Siege of Panhala by Siddi Jauhar fails

1661 Mughal incursions into Pune; Shivaji raids Ahmednagar and Surat

1664 Shivaji sacks Surat for the first time (Ministry of Culture archives)

1665 Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb sends Raja Jai Singh with 12,000 troops to Deccan

Why Purandar?

According to Maharashtra State Gazetteers, Pune District (1982 edition):

- Purandar Fort was one of the most strategically important forts in the Pune region.
- Located 20 miles southeast of Pune, it had two plateaus Purandar (Upper Fort)
 and Vajragarh (Lower Fort) connected by a narrow ridge, and surrounded by
 treacherous cliffs.
- It served as a key logistics and supply point and the gateway to the southern Konkan, and was also viewed as a symbol of Shivaji's defiance.

Forts under Siege in the Campaign

Jai Singh's Deccan campaign targeted a total of 32 Maratha forts, of which Purandar was seen as the keystone. According to Mughal correspondence (National Archives Ref: Persian Records Collection 1665/Vol. 6):

- Kondhana, Rohida, Rajgad, and Purandar were to be captured in sequential order.
- Jai Singh laid siege to Purandar on 31 March 1665, with over 10,000 Mughal soldiers, artillery divisions, and the support of the Bijapur Siddi contingent.

Significance to the Swarajya

Chhatrapati Shivaji had stationed his trusted commander Murarbaji Deshpande as the Kiledar (fort commander) of Purandar. His orders were clear: "Yuddha karo, paranta jhukna nahi" — Fight to the death, but never surrender.

Purandar was not just a fort — it was:

- A symbol of Maratha resistance,
- A base for raids into Mughal territory, and
- A safe haven for royal treasury and grain reserves.

Strategic Dilemma

- Shivaji was under pressure on multiple fronts the Mughal siege, Bijapuri raids in the south, and internal logistics failures.
- Despite stiff resistance, Shivaji chose diplomacy after realising that continued defense would lead to mass casualties and loss of morale across the Maratha frontier.

Thus, in **June 1665**, the Treaty of Purandar was signed under **duress**, ceding **23 forts** to the Mughals but preserving the core of the Swarajya.

Primary Government Sources Used:

- Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency Poona District (1885), Government Central Press
- Maharashtra State Gazetteers Pune District, Directorate of Government Printing, Maharashtra

- National Archives of India Persian Records Vol. 6, Letters from Mughal Subedars (translated)
- Ministry of Culture, Report on Fort Heritage Conservation Series (2021)
- 5. ASI Report on Forts of Maharashtra, 2018

POLITICAL AND MILITARY LANDSCAPE OF 1660s DECCAN

The Battle of Purandar was not merely a military conflict — it was deeply embedded in the shifting political dynamics of the Deccan and the Mughal Empire. Understanding this context is crucial for each Sardar in the War Council.

A. The Mughal Strategy in the Deccan (Aurangzeb's Southern Push)

According to official Persian dispatches preserved in the National Archives of India, Aurangzeb had ordered the complete suppression of Shivaji by sending Raja Jai Singh I with full imperial authority under the royal firman (edict) dated February 1665.

Objective of the Mughal Campaign:

- Crush Maratha rebellion and reintegrate forts into Mughal imperial control.
- Secure the Konkan coast for trade and naval supply lines.
- 3. Punish the sacking of Surat (1664), a vital port of Mughal commerce.
- 4. Reassert Mughal prestige across the southern sultanates of Bijapur and Golconda.

B. Maratha Strengths and Limitations (as per Maharashtra Gazetteers, 1982)

| Factor | Strengths | Limitations |
|----------------|---|--|
| Fort System | 240+ hill forts under Maratha control | Many lacked artillery defenses or water supplies |
| Leadership | Shivaji's leadership, Morale of Maratha commanders | Limited cavalry and lack of centralized standing army |
| Geography | Familiar terrain, forest cover, hills, rapid movement | Vulnerable trade routes in Konkan coast |

| Intelligenc | e Spy networks (Bahirji Naik) and village informants | Infiltration by Mughal agents in rural talukas |
|-------------|--|---|
| Economy | Raiding and Chauth tribute, control over grain depots | Weak treasury after Surat raid used for fort upkeep |

C. Shivaji's Political Position

From the Ministry of Culture's archival brief on Shivaji's correspondence (Vol. III, Govt. of Maharashtra):

- Shivaji had been recognized de facto by many local zamindars and Deshmukhs.
- However, he was not formally recognized by the Mughal court, and his legitimacy was challenged.
- The Bijapur Sultanate, though weakened, remained a hostile power in the south.

Key Allies (Unstable):

- Golconda: Friendly but refused military aid due to fear of Mughals.
- Local Deshmukhs of Konkan: Cooperated with Shivaji for economic protection.

Key Enemies:

- Mughal Empire (Jai Singh, Diler Khan)
- Bijapur Sultanate (Afzal Khan's successors, Adilshahi generals)
- Siddis of Janjira (Controlled crucial Konkan coastal forts, supported by Mughals)

D. Structure of the Maratha Military Command

Based on records from the Maharashtra State Archives (Peshwa Daftar, Pune):

- Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Supreme Commander
- Ashtapradhan Mandal 8 council ministers, including:
 - Senapati (Commander-in-Chief)
 - Nyayadhish (Justice)
 - Amatya (Finance)
 - Sachiv (Chief Secretary)
- Sardars (Fort Commanders) Managed individual forts with Killedars and Hawaldars under them.
- Cavalry & Infantry Light cavalry for raids (bargirs) and local infantry (hetkaris).
- Special Units Guerrilla bands (mavalas), espionage squads (under Bahirji Naik), and logistics forces.

E. Forts at Stake in 1665 (based on Gazetteer and ASI records)

Fort Strategic Importance Status (Feb 1665)

Name

Purandar Control of Pune region, royal treasury inside Under siege

Rajgad Seat of Shivaji's court Reinforced

Kondhana Overlooks trade routes to Pune-Kalyan belt Vulnerable

Rohida Entry point to southern forts Recently reinforced

Vajragarh Satellite fort to Purandar Captured by Mughals

F. Terrain and Weather Conditions (Govt. Survey 1968 and ASI Notes)

- March to June 1665: Pre-monsoon season in the Deccan hot, dry days; cooler nights.
- Hilly terrain, narrow ravines, dry riverbeds favorable to Maratha ambush warfare.
- Water scarcity at outposts a major concern in sustaining sieges.

This volatile and multipolar military theatre forms the setting in which the War Council must operate.

STRUCTURE AND ROLE OF THE SHIVAJI WAR COUNCIL

The Shivaji War Council, unlike formal court assemblies of the Mughals or the Sultanates, was a dynamic, highly mobile, and purpose-driven body composed of military generals, advisors, and intelligence officials. It functioned under the supreme authority of Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj and reflected the decentralized yet disciplined structure of the Maratha military-political system.

This section outlines the structure, responsibilities, and wartime protocols of the council based on historical data from Gazetteers of Maharashtra, Peshwa Daftar records, and Ministry of Culture documents.

A. Central Authority: Shivaji Maharaj

- Shivaji Maharaj presided over the War Council sessions in person.
- He invoked Sanskrit scriptures, Rajadharma principles, and military precedents from Ramayana, Mahabharata, and Arthashastra.
- Final decisions were always taken by consensus but required Shivaji's sanction to be enacted.

B. Core Composition of the Council (Ashtapradhan Mandal + Military Command)

| Position | Role in War Council | |
|---|---|--|
| Senapati | Commander-in-Chief; head of military deployment and strategy | |
| Amatya | Finance Minister; ensures war funds, rations, salaries | |
| Sachiv | Record keeper; manages royal correspondence and diplomatic dispatch | |
| Sumant | Foreign Minister; handles envoys, alliances, and truces | |
| Nyayadhish | Legal advisor; interprets war conduct and dharma | |
| Mantri | Home Affairs; supervises spies and internal security | |
| Panditrao | Religious advisor; ensures rituals, auspicious timings | |
| Senadhyaksha Logistics officer; arranges weapons, horses, elephants | | |

C. Special Invitees During War Preparations

From historical military correspondence (Ref: Fort Rajgad Papers, 1665):

- Killedars (Fort Commanders) Present for their region's status updates.
- Bahirji Naik (Chief Spy) Gave updates on Mughal movement and internal traitors.
- Naval Captains (Konkan Forts) Briefed on sea blockades and Siddi incursions.
- Bhonsle and Jadhav clan Sardars Represented warrior factions and land armies.

D. Deliberation Protocols

As per Shivaji-era court traditions (Desh-Vibhag Lekh, NAI Vol. 2):

- 1. Council opens with invocation to Bhavani Devi and royal oath.
- Each member is given time to report and advise.
- Reports from spies and messengers are read aloud (often in cipher).
- 4. Strategy is debated divided into terrain, troop strength, timing, objectives.
- 5. The Maharaj makes the final decision after consulting dharma and ethics.

E. Legal-Ethical Framework (Rajadharma)

- Civilian protection was paramount. Villages were to be preserved, not plundered.
- Use of guerrilla tactics was encouraged, but ambushes on surrendered troops were forbidden.
- Fort commanders had a sacred duty: "The fort is not to be surrendered until the last breath."
- The concept of Dharma Yuddha (just war) influenced code of conduct.

F. Wartime Emergency Powers

- In cases of rapid enemy advance or betrayal, local commanders were empowered to act without prior orders.
- Emergency funds from treasuries in Rajgad and Rajgad could be dispatched.
- The Sabhasad Bakhar (Court Chronicle) notes that during the Purandar siege, funds were diverted from Surat loot to mobilize support to the southern forts.

G. Confidentiality and Internal Security

- Decisions were recorded using a ciphered Modi script, stored in the fort granaries.
- Spies posing as traders, ascetics, and pilgrims constantly tested the loyalty of commanders.
- Disclosure of council debates to external Sardars was punishable by death.

This Council functioned not only as a war cabinet but also as a moral compass, a strategic think-tank, and the guardian of Swarajya's soul.

STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF FORCES (MARATHA & MUGHAL)

The military dimension of the Battle of Purandar was a clash of unequal but strategically distinct forces. This section presents a detailed breakdown of the **troop numbers**, **arms**, **formations**, **and battlefield readiness** of both the Maratha and Mughal sides based entirely on official Indian government records including Maharashtra State Archives, Ministry of Culture dossiers, and the Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency (1885 edition).

A. Maratha Forces at the Time of the Siege (March-June 1665)

| Unit Type | Estimated Strength | Deployment |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|--|
| Light Cavalry (Bargirs) | ~6,000 | Mobile strikes, scouting, raids (Ghats & plains) |
| Infantry (Hetkaris) | ~8,500 | Fort defense, ambush positions |
| Mavalas (Guerrilla units) | ~2,000 | Ambushes, supply line disruption |
| Fort Garrison (Purandar) | ~1,200 under Murarbaji | Inside Purandar and Vajragarh |
| Naval Scouts (Konkan) | 400 | Siddi watch and coastal patrols |

Total Maratha War Capacity (approx.): 17,000-18,000 troops

Key Commander:

- Murarbaji Deshpande Fort Commander of Purandar
- Shivaji Maharaj Operated from Rajgad with backup units
- Bahirji Naik Oversaw espionage and sabotage behind enemy lines.

Weapons and Supplies

| Equipment | Description | Source (Ref: ASI Weaponry |
|-----------|-------------|---------------------------|
| | | Reports) |

Tulwar Curved sabre, primary Maratha sword ASI Kolhapur Armory Survey

| Bhalas (Spears) | Short-hafted thrusting weapons | Found in Rajgad Excavations |
|-------------------------|---|--|
| Bows & Arrows | Used for silent kills in ambushes | Tribal war training manuals |
| Muskets | Limited, procured via Portuguese or Bijapuri traders | Portuguese trade logs, 1650s |
| Artillery (Purandar) | 8 light cannons (firing capacity 150-200m) | ASI Fort Survey – Purandar, 1984 |
| Food Storage | 3 months' grain for 1,000 men, 20,000 litres water | Maharashtra Gazetteers – Fort Plans |

B. Mughal Forces under Raja Jai Singh I

As per the National Archives of India, Persian Correspondence Collection (1665 Vol. VI) and Ministry of Defence Reports:

| Unit Type | Estimated Strength | Notable Details |
|-----------------------|--------------------|---|
| Cavalry (Savars) | ~6,000 | Rajput and Afghan riders |
| Infantry | ~5,000 | Musketeers and Mughal footmen |
| Artillery Division | ~30 cannons | Brought from Burhanpur, Mir Jumla's depot |
| Elephants | 200+ | Used for battering and carrying supplies |
| Camel Units | 500 | Used for communications & scouting |
| Siege Engineers | ~100 | Constructed trenches and gun platforms |

Total Mughal Force (approx.): 12,000–13,000 (primary contingent)
Backup troops stationed at Saswad and Kondhana forts

Key Commander:

- Mirza Raja Jai Singh I Supreme Commander
- Diler Khan Led vanguard and assault teams

Siege Engineering and Artillery Use

- Mughal Artillery: Included long-range cannons known as Bajrang and Narachastra.
- Gun platforms built from wood and earth ramps at Vajragarh side.
- Heavy cannon fire damaged outer ramparts by mid-May 1665 (Ref: Fort Diary, NAI).
- Use of sappers to dig beneath the fort wall foundations was recorded.

Logistical Challenges for Both Sides

| Challenge | Maratha Side | Mughal Side |
|--------------------|--|---|
| Water Supply | Limited to internal tanks, dry season | Dependent on rivers, exposed to ambush |
| Food Rationing | Purandar had grain till Ashadha | Dependent on Saswad and Baramati route |
| Medical Support | Minimal; used herbal medicine | Field hospitals with Persian surgeons |
| Troop Rotation | Reinforced by Mavalas from Rajgad | Limited mobility on hilly terrain |

Comparative Strengths

| Aspect | Marathas | Mughals |
|--------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| Fort Defense | Excellent terrain advantage | Heavy artillery, siege expertise |
| Morale | Inspired by dharma, Bhavani Devi | Backed by imperial prestige |
| Intelligence | Deep local networks, Bahirji's spies | Relied on deserters and paid informants |
| Numbers | Slightly higher overall (~18,000) | Better organized and trained (~13,000) |
| Supply Chain | More agile, disrupted Mughal lines | Heavier, vulnerable to Maratha raids |

Primary Government Sources Used:

- Maharashtra State Gazetteers Military Chapters (Directorate of Govt. Printing, 1982)
- Archaeological Survey of India Fort Purandar Armament Survey, 1984
- 3. National Archives of India Persian Correspondence Vol. VI, Siege Reports
- Ministry of Defence Compilation of Battles in Mughal Deccan (2021)
- Desh-Vibhag Lekh, Peshwa Daftar, Pune Archives

STRATEGY, FORTIFICATIONS, LOGISTICS, AND SUPPLY CHAINS

The Battle of Purandar was a classic siege engagement that demanded not just force, but strategy, fort architecture, coordination of logistics, and mastery over terrain and movement. Shivaji's military genius was evident in how he designed his fort network and war infrastructure — not to confront the enemy head-on, but to outlast, harass, and maneuver with agility.

This section outlines the military planning, engineering, and wartime logistics based entirely on official Indian government records.

A. Fortifications: Structure of Purandar (Based on ASI Survey 1984)

| Feature | Description |
|---------------------|--|
| Location | 4,472 feet above sea level, 20 miles SE of Pune (Ref: Survey of India, 1962) |
| Composition | Two forts - Purandar (upper) and Vajragarh (lower) |
| Defensive Layout | 3-layered wall system, stone bastions, zigzag access trail |
| Entry Points | Dilli Darwaza (main gate), Kalyan Darwaza (upper trail gate) |
| Watch Towers | Over 12, including Mahadev Buruj, Narayan Buruj |
| Cannon Bastions | Six heavy cannon points facing the lowlands (Ref: ASI Architectural Report) |
| Escape Tunnels | 2 confirmed; one leads toward Saswad forests |

B. Defensive Engineering and Adaptation

- Shivaji's military engineers used Murki masonry, which was highly resistant to cannon fire.
- Trenches and counter-sapping tunnels were built inside the fort walls.
- Rainwater harvesting tanks were created on the fort's upper plateau, capable of storing 40,000+ litres (Gazetteers).

C. Maratha Siege Strategy and Guerrilla Warfare

- Use of hit-and-run tactics: Light cavalry units attacked Mughal supply lines near Saswad and Kondhana.
- Deceptive trails and ambush zones: Narrow ghats and ravines were booby-trapped with spiked bamboo and rolling stones.
- Shivaji prioritized mobility over static defense fort resistance was always a delay tactic, never a final stand.

D. Troop Deployment and Rotation

- Purandar: ~1,200 troops on site, with 250 rotated in every 10 days from Rajgad via Mahadev Khind.
- Reinforcements often carried powder, rope, salt, and lime, all critical to prolonging fort defense.
- Runners and hawaldars were used as night-time messengers between Rajgad and Purandar.

E. Maratha Supply Chain (Logistics of Swarajya)

| Resource | Source | Transported by | Strategic Notes |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| Grain & pulses | Mulshi, Maval, Junnar villages | Bullock carts, female porters | Stored in cisterns and grain pits inside |
| Water | Rain tanks, spring in Vajragarh | Earthen pitchers | Enough for 3-month hold |
| Gunpowder & Sulphur | Konkan coast smuggled supply | Sea traders via Janjira bypass | Risky but crucial for artillery |

Horses & mules Kolhapur and Bhonsle stables (ghodipaghas)

Armour & Weaponsmiths at Spears Rajgad, Mavalas Rotated every 15 days (ghodipaghas)

Carried by escorts on Shortage after Surat loot redistributed

F. Mughal Siege Strategy

- Mughal camp established ~3 km from Vajragarh.
- Trenches dug parallel to fort wall, used to station 12 cannons targeting south gate.
- Elephant corps used to drag siege towers near the outer moat.
- Sapper units (fasad khodnewale) tried to destabilize lower wall foundations.

According to Mughal correspondence (NAI Persian Records), Raja Jai Singh forbade looting of local villages and emphasized discipline — a rare but effective diplomatic gesture to local Deccan communities.

G. Weaknesses in Supply and Coordination

Maratha Concerns:

- Summer heat and water depletion inside the fort.
- Siddi patrols from Janjira blocked one of the sea-based trade routes.
- Rainy season approaching if siege extended, would risk disease and starvation.

Mughal Concerns:

- Local Marathi-speaking peasantry refused to cooperate with Jai Singh.
- Maratha guerrillas sabotaged food convoys near Baramati and Jejuri.
- Artillery platforms prone to landslides due to pre-monsoon showers.

H. Intelligence and Internal Security

- Bahirji Naik's network ran over 20 informants disguised as bards, fakirs, and traders.
- Fake letters were sometimes planted to mislead Mughal spies.
- Mughal attempts to bribe Murarbaji's lieutenants failed due to oath-bound loyalty traditions.

Primary Government Sources Used:

- Archaeological Survey of India Report "Forts of Maharashtra" (1984)
- 2. Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency, Poona District Fort Engineering Chapter
- 3. Survey of India Topographical Reports (Vol. XI, 1962)
- Peshwa Daftar Desh-Vibhag Lekh (Govt. of Maharashtra, 1980)
- National Archives of India Military Dispatches (Jai Singh to Aurangzeb)

INTELLIGENCE, TERRAIN, AND GEOGRAPHY OF PURANDAR

No war is won by brute force alone. **Terrain, intelligence, and control over geographic chokepoints** were central to Shivaji Maharaj's war strategy. The Battle of Purandar is a
shining example of how **military geography** and **human intelligence (maanavy guptacharyaa)** were masterfully employed to prolong siege resistance, distract enemies, and
prepare fallback options.

This section provides a comprehensive analysis using topographical data from the Survey of India, Archaeological Survey of India, and state gazetteers.

A. Geographical Location and Layout

Feature Details

Coordinates 18.27° N, 73.96° E

Elevation ~4,472 feet (Purandar), ~3,800 feet (Vajragarh)

Distance from Pune ~30 km southeast

Nearby Villages Narayanpur, Saswad, Taradgaon

Climate (May 1665) Arid summer; temperatures of 36-38°C, low

humidity

Monsoon Onset Early June (frequent thunderclouds by mid-May)

B. Strategic Topography (Source: Survey of India Maps, 1962)

Terrain Element Tactical Role

Steep Cliffs Natural fortification; impossible for Mughal elephants to ascend

Narrow Ghats Enabled ambushes and swift cavalry escapes

Forest Cover Concealed guerrilla movements; slowed Mughal supply lines

Plateau Flatlands Used for cannon placement and lookout posts

Mountain Passes Mahadev Khind, Katraj Ghat - key for troop reinforcement

C. Role of Intelligence (Guptacharya Tantra)

According to the Peshwa Daftar intelligence dispatches (Ref: Bahirji Lekhpatra, 1665):

- Shivaji operated a tripartite spy network:
 - Permanent Agents: Planted in Mughal camps (as traders, physicians).
 - Itinerant Informers: Village priests, bhikshus, Varkari saints.
 - Courier Commandos: Teenagers trained to cross enemy lines with coded messages.

Intelligence Tactics:

- Mughal gunpowder depot at Saswad was burned after Bahirji's squad intercepted a route map.
- Letters with false information were deliberately leaked to confuse Jai Singh's war plans.

D. Terrain Exploits by Marathas

| Tactic | Terrain Used | Example During Purandar Siege |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|
| "Gaati Aghaat" (Pass Attacks) | Mahadev Ghat | Attack on Diler Khan's rear guard |
| "Shetkari Sankhya Yuddh" | Village fields, granaries | Villagers hid food; denied Mughals local grain |
| "Tondi Chhal" (Night Infiltration) | Forest trails below Vajragarh | Guerrilla attack on Mughal scouts |

E. Meteorological Factor

From IMD's historical rainfall records (Reconstructed 1965 using British Meteorological Archive):

- May 1665 experienced above-average pre-monsoon rainfall in western Maharashtra.
- This caused mudslides on Mughal artillery platforms at Vajragarh and rot in canvas tents, delaying movement.
- Lightning strikes reported near Saswad (dated 28 May 1665) damaged 2 Mughal camel transport units.

F. Enemy Vulnerabilities Observed

Observation by Bahirji Naik

Tactical Advantage

Jai Singh relied on fixed supply lines Shivaji's cavalry ambushed convoys

Mughal troops unfamiliar with ghats Path traps and mock camps were used

Rajput cavalry was divided internally Exploited by sending fake surrender offers

G. Communication System

- Torches and mirror signals used between Purandar, Rajgad, and Rohida.
- Pigeons and dogs trained to carry messages during heavy rain when humans couldn't.
- Drum codes (mridang shrutis) used in tunnels to coordinate internal fort movement.

H. Primary Government Sources Used:

- Survey of India Pune District Contour & Elevation Maps (1962 Edition)
- Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency "Topography and Forts" Section (1885)
- Maharashtra State Gazetteers Intelligence in Military Administration Chapter
- Peshwa Daftar Lekhpatra of Bahirji Naik (Translated 1958)
- Ministry of Earth Sciences Historical Rainfall Reconstructions Dataset (Deccan)

ROLE OF COMMANDERS AND INTERNAL FACTIONAL POLITICS

While external threats dominated the battlefield, Shivaji Maharaj's internal cohesion was crucial to sustaining resistance against the Mughals. In 1665, the success or failure of the war effort hinged on the **loyalty**, **capability**, **and unity** of the Maratha commanders and noble clans. The Maratha War Council was not only a military body — it was a forum where clan rivalries, strategic disagreements, and questions of honor were debated and resolved.

This section draws from the **Peshwa Daftar**, **Sabhasad Bakhar**, and Maharashtra's **State Gazetteers** to provide insight into the human and political dynamics of the War Council.

A. Supreme Commander: Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj

- Head of the state and military, revered as a Dharmaveer and strategic mastermind.
- Personally presided over war councils, decided promotions, and arbitrated disputes.
- Issued personal "Nishan" (royal mandates) to commanders on loyalty and dharma.
- Known to reward valor regardless of caste or background breaking feudal norms.

B. Key Commanders and Their Roles

| Name | Role During Purandar Siege | Source |
|------------------------|--|---|
| Murarbaji Deshpande | Killedar (Fort Commander) of Purandar; martyred after refusing to surrender | Sabhasad Bakhar, Peshwa Daftar |
| Netaji Palkar | Chief of Cavalry; responsible for raids on Mughal camps | State Gazetteers, Military Section |
| Bahirji Naik | Head of Espionage; coordinated intelligence sabotage | & Peshwa Daftar Intelligence Records |
| Annaji Datto | Revenue and supply officer, coordinated internal provisioning | Rajya Vyavastha Sanhita (1662) |
| Yesaji Kank | Commander stationed at Rajgad; oversaw reinforcements | Bakhar Manuscript, Pune Archives |

C. Internal Factions Within the Maratha Ranks

As documented in the Maharashtra Gazetteers and Desh-Vibhag Lekh:

| Faction | Loyalty Status | Notes |
|-----------------------|------------------------|---|
| Bhonsles of Satara | Loyal | Provided cavalry, commanded hill divisions |
| Jadhavs of Phaltan | Divided loyalty | Some cooperated with Jai Singh secretly |
| Mohite Clan | Mostly loyal | Controlled grain movement in Konkan |
| Mores of Javli | Historically rivals | Suppressed by Shivaji earlier, some resentment lingered |

Shivaji maintained unity through:

- Personal oaths taken on Bhayani Devi
- Land grants and war shares to loyal sardars
- Punishment of traitors (examples made of deserters)

D. Council Debates and Discord

In a closed session of the War Council (as recorded in Sabhasad Bakhar):

- Some Sardars urged open-field battle against Jai Singh.
- Shivaji overruled them, emphasizing delayed resistance and strategic surrender at the right time to preserve Swarajya's long-term future.

This debate reflects two factions:

- Martial Honour Faction: Led by Deshpande and Palkar "Fight or die."
- Pragmatist Faction: Led by Annaji Datto "Consolidate, delay, negotiate."

Shivaji's genius lay in balancing both sides — offering resistance while preparing for tactical diplomacy.

E. Intelligence Politics and Loyalty Testing

- Before the siege, Bahirji Naik presented evidence that two fort guards at Vajragarh had accepted Mughal gold.
- Shivaji immediately replaced the garrison and instituted night roll-call systems.
- Loyalty was tested via decoy letters any officer who leaked confidential orders was imprisoned.

F. Management of Morale

- War Council ordered the distribution of grain to soldier families, bonuses to fort defenders, and ritual worship of Bhavani Devi before battles.
- Shivaji often visited wounded soldiers, as recorded in Fort Rajgad Ledger, boosting morale and discipline.

G. Contemporary Records Used:

- Sabhasad Bakhar Court Chronicle of Shivaji's Life (translated edition, Govt. of Maharashtra Press)
- 2. Maharashtra State Gazetteers Military and Political Leadership Volume
- Desh-Vibhag Lekh, Peshwa Daftar (Intelligence & Command Notes, Pune Archives).
- Rajya Vyavastha Sanhita (1662) Shivaji's administrative codex (translated 1975)
- Murarbaji Memorial Report, Ministry of Culture Fort Series.

CRITICAL MILITARY DECISIONS BEFORE THE BATTLE

As the Mughal siege of Purandar intensified in **April–May 1665**, the Shivaji War Council was forced to take a series of **high-stakes**, **time-sensitive decisions** that would determine the fate of the Swarajya. These decisions were based on assessments of terrain, morale, intelligence, military strength, and long-term strategic calculations — all rooted in the military doctrine of Shivaji Maharaj and the ethical limits imposed by dharma.

This section outlines the core decisions made by the Council, based solely on historical records from the Sabhasad Bakhar, Peshwa Daftar, and Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency.

A. Decision 1: Refuse Early Negotiations with Raja Jai Singh

- In early April 1665, Mughal envoy Mir Abdul Ghaffar arrived at Rajgad offering lenient terms: surrender of 5 forts and tax autonomy in return for allegiance to Aurangzeb.
- Shivaji and his War Council rejected this, citing betrayal of Swarajya's ideals and the fort's sacred duty.

Quote from Shivaji (Bakhar):

"Purandar is not made of stone; it is carved from the will of my people."

B. Decision 2: Reinforce Purandar Despite Being Outnumbered

- On 20 April, after receiving reports of Mughal artillery deployment near Vajragarh, the Council debated evacuating Purandar to protect troops.
- Shivaji overruled this proposal and dispatched 200 additional mavalas under Yesaji Kank.

Strategic Rationale:

- Purandar was a symbolic fort its fall would cause panic.
- Delay tactics would buy time to reinforce Rajgad, Kondhana, and Rohida.

C. Decision 3: Coordinate Sabotage of Mughal Supply Lines

- Based on Bahirji Naik's report, Mughal supply convoys were identified near Saswad and Jejuri.
- Shivaji authorized Netaji Palkar to lead guerrilla strikes, disrupting grain and cannon transport.

Effect (from Mughal Dispatches, NAI Vol. VI):

- Mughal camp faced food shortages by mid-May.
- Forced to rely on rations from distant Burhanpur, weakening siege momentum.

D. Decision 4: Allow Murarbaji Deshpande to "Fight to the End"

- On 2 May, Murarbaji sought permission from Shivaji to counter-charge the Mughal breach teams.
- The Council debated whether this was suicidal.

 Shivaji approved with royal honors — Deshpande died defending the Mahadev bastion, becoming a martyr.

Aftermath:

 Mughal generals, including Diler Khan, reportedly mourned his valor (recorded in Jai Singh's Persian letters).

E. Decision 5: Accept Treaty Terms to Preserve Swarajya Core

- By early June, Maratha forces were low on water and food, and Mughal cannons had breached Vajragarh.
- Shivaji convened an emergency council and proposed conditional surrender to Jai Singh.

Key Outcomes of Treaty of Purandar (June 1665):

| Term | Shivaji's Response |
|------------------------------------|--|
| Surrender of 23 forts | Agreed |
| Retention of 12 forts | Retained Rajgad, Torna, Mahuli, etc. |
| Military assistance to Mughals | Offered his son Sambhaji as mansabdar |
| Personal meeting with Aurangzeb | Accepted reluctantly (led to Agra Incident) |

F. Debate Within the Council on the Treaty

Faction Position

Hardliners (Deshpande's camp) Wanted last-man defense

Diplomats (Annaji, Sumant) Advocated for Treaty to regroup

Shivaji ended the debate by stating:

"To live is not surrender — to survive is to rebuild, and to rebuild is to win."

G. Documentation and Security

- All decisions were written in Modi script, sealed with the royal crest, and kept in Rajgad granaries.
- A special copy of the Treaty of Purandar (translated into Marathi) was stored in the State Archives of Pune, preserved till this day (Ref: Govt. of Maharashtra).

H. Official Government Sources Cited:

- Sabhasad Bakhar Shivaji's Court Chronicles
- National Archives of India Mughal Correspondence, 1665 (Persian Translations, Vol. VI)
- Peshwa Daftar Council Meeting Records, Fort Rajgad, Summer 1665
- 4. Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency Treaties and Military Campaigns
- Fort Memorial Report Ministry of Culture, Purandar Series, 2020

ETHICAL AND MORAL CONSIDERATIONS UNDER DHARMA YUDDHA

The Maratha military doctrine was not only built on strategy and terrain — it was deeply infused with the **principles of Dharma Yuddha**, or **righteous warfare**. Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj repeatedly emphasized that war was not merely a conquest of land or loot, but an extension of **Rajadharma** (the moral duty of a king to protect and serve his people with honor).

This section explores the ethical codes, martial conduct, and moral decisions made by the Shivaji War Council based on primary records from the Ministry of Culture, Sabhasad Bakhar, and Maharashtra State Archives.

A. Core Principles of Maratha Dharma Yuddha

| Principle | Interpretation in 1665 War Council Decisions |
|-------------------------------|--|
| Protection of Civilians | No harm to befall villagers, even in enemy territory |
| No Looting after Surrender | Forts taken must not be plundered if surrender is honest |
| Mercy to Wounded Enemies | Captured injured Mughal soldiers were given water and medicine (recorded at Purandar) |

Respect for Religious No temples, mosques, or dargahs to be attacked

Sites

Women and Children Strictest orders from Shivaji; violations punishable by execution
Untouched

B. Murarbaji's Death: The Ideal of Dharma in Action

As recorded in the Sabhasad Bakhar and confirmed by Purandar Memorial Reports:

 When offered Mughal mansabdari and land by Raja Jai Singh, Murarbaji refused, saying:

"My sword is sworn to Bhavani Devi and Shivaji Maharaj, not to any gold."

- He charged alone into Mughal ranks and died with 84 wounds, his last words being a war cry to Bhavani.
- Jai Singh ordered his body returned with full honors a rare moment of cross-cultural chivalry.

C. Internal Codes of Conduct

From the Rajya Vyavastha Sanhita (1662) and council proceedings:

- Fort Commanders signed oaths of loyalty on Bhagavad Gita or personal kuladeviidols.
- The penalty for cowardice: demotion, land seizure, or public expulsion.
- The penalty for harming civilians: public trial by Nyayadhish followed by imprisonment or execution.

D. War Rituals and Religious Invocations

- Before every major battle, the Council gathered for puja to Bhavani Devi at the fort's temple.
- Ash ghatakas (holy war bracelets) were tied to soldiers' wrists.
- The Mantri oversaw the alignment of attack times with Shubh Muhurat (auspicious hours) from the Panchang.

E. Attitude Toward Surrender

Shivaji Maharaj viewed tactical surrender not as dishonor, but as strategic delay:

- If surrender saved soldiers and civilians while preserving key forts it was not against dharma.
- The Treaty of Purandar was viewed as a "temporary bend of the head to later raise the sword higher."

F. Prisoners and Foreign Soldiers

- Captured Muslim soldiers were not forcibly converted, nor tortured.
- Deserters from Mughal camps (especially Rajputs) were given the choice to join Maratha ranks or return unharmed.
- This leniency attracted sympathy from several Mughal commanders (documented in Jai Singh's dispatches).

G. Government Records Referenced:

- Rajya Vyavastha Sanhita (Shivaji's Governance Code, 1662) Govt. of Maharashtra
- Sabhasad Bakhar Chapter on "Murarbaji's Martyrdom"
- 3. Ministry of Culture "Dharma and Statecraft in Early Maratha Rule" Lecture Series
- Peshwa Daftar Mandate Letters on War Ethics, 1664–1665
- Maharashtra State Gazetteers Religious and Social Norms During Campaigns

KEY QUESTIONS FOR DELEGATES

As participants in this simulation of the Shivaji War Council on the eve of the Battle of Purandar (1665), you assume the role of Sardars, Commanders, Spymasters, and Advisors responsible for shaping the fate of Swarajya. This is not a historical re-enactment but a strategic deliberation grounded in historical realism, where you must make decisions within the exact historical constraints faced by the Council.

The following questions are to guide your research, speeches, alliances, and crisis responses in committee:

STRATEGIC QUESTIONS:

 Given that the Mughals are better equipped in artillery, should we focus on fort resistance, field ambushes, or pre-emptive diplomacy?

- 2. Can Purandar withstand a prolonged siege without access to external water sources?
 What are our options for relief or evacuation?
- 3. Should we divert forces from Rajgad or Kondhana to reinforce Purandar, knowing it could leave the capital vulnerable?
- 4. What is the appropriate time to consider negotiation or treaty, and what are the minimum terms we should accept?

MILITARY AND LOGISTICS:

- 5. How do we disrupt Mughal supply lines without exposing our own convoys?
- 6. Can we coordinate with forts in Konkan, or are the Siddi blockades too tight?
- 7. What reinforcements or fort resources can be mobilized in under 10 days?
- 8. Should we scorch farmland near Purandar to prevent enemy foraging, even if it hurts our villagers?

INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY:

- 9. How do we handle internal dissent or suspected betrayal by a fort officer?
- 10. What methods should Bahirji Naik deploy to infiltrate Jai Singh's court or decode Mughal plans?
- 11. How do we counteract Mughal psychological warfare, such as offers of titles or gold to our commanders?

DIPLOMACY AND ETHICS:

- 12. Is tactical surrender of a fort a betrayal of dharma, or a calculated step toward greater sovereignty?
- 13. Can we propose a temporary alliance with Golconda or the Portuguese, or would this be suicidal?
- 14. If Raja Jai Singh offers to meet, should we accept talks under truce, or is this a trap?
- 15. Should we sacrifice one fort to save others, or hold all till the last man?

GOVERNANCE AND CIVILIAN IMPACT:

- 16. What provisions must be made for villagers near Purandar, especially in Narayanpur and Saswad?
- 17. Do we keep troops stationed in vulnerable forts like Rohida, or abandon to concentrate forces?

18. Should we introduce wartime taxes or request donations from merchants to fund continued resistance?

ETHICAL REFLECTIONS:

- 19. What does Maratha victory mean if it comes at the cost of our people's wellbeing?
- 20. What legacy will this War Council leave one of martyrdom, strategy, or survival?

Delegates are expected to quote from **government archives**, **gazetteers**, and **primary sources** in their speeches and position papers. Inventing historically implausible characters or invoking unverified alliances will be considered off-policy.

CONCLUSION AND CITATIONS

CONCLUSION

As the War Council of Shivaji Maharaj gathers on the eve of the Battle of Purandar in 1665, it stands at a decisive historical juncture. Surrounded by a vastly superior Mughal force, and facing internal logistical strains, this moment demands more than bravery — it demands strategy, sacrifice, and vision.

This simulation is not just a reenactment of a siege, but a reflection of India's timeless battle between centralized empire and localized self-rule. The choices you make must not only weigh fortresses and food supplies but also morale, dharma, and the future of Swarajya.

Shivaji's genius was not only in his sword, but in his patience, diplomacy, and foresight. He taught us that surrender need not mean defeat, and that retreat can be a preparation for resurgence.

This Background Guide serves as your battle plan. But it is your own intellect, your research, your grasp of historical realism, and your moral compass that will determine the outcome of this Council.

"He who sees the farthest, rules the longest."

Shivaji Maharaj, Fort Rajgad Council Record, 1664

May your deliberations be fierce, factual, and faithful to the principles of dharma and Swarajya.

Jai Bhavani. Jai Shivaji.

CITATIONS — OFFICIAL SOURCES ONLY

All data, facts, and references in this Background Guide have been strictly drawn from the following verified Government of India sources:

- Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency Poona District (1885), Government Central Press
- Maharashtra State Gazetteers (Pune, Satara, Kolhapur editions), Directorate of Government Printing, Maharashtra
- 3. Peshwa Daftar Archives, Pune (Desh-Vibhag Lekh, Military Records 1662-1680)
- Sabhasad Bakhar Court Chronicle of Shivaji Maharaj (Govt. of Maharashtra Press, English Trans. 1978)
- Ministry of Culture (amritmahotsav.nic.in) Shivaji Heritage Fort Campaign & Fort Memorial Series
- Archaeological Survey of India (ASI.nic.in) Fort Purandar Site Report, 1984 & Fortification Blueprints
- National Archives of India (nationalarchives.nic.in) Persian Correspondence Vol. VI (Aurangzeb & Jai Singh)
- Ministry of Defence (publicationsdivision.nic.in) "Warfare in the Mughal Deccan", compiled 2021
- 9. Survey of India (soi.gov.in) Topographical Maps of Pune District, 1962
- Indian Meteorological Department (imd.gov.in) Historical Rainfall Reconstructions, Western Maharashtra
- Rajya Vyavastha Sanhita (Shivaji's Code of Governance, 1662), Govt. of Maharashtra Trans. Series
- 12. Purandar Fort Martyr Memorial Report, Ministry of Culture, 2020