SHIS
MUN
2025

MUNICH CONFERENCE

BACKGROUND GUIDE

Role of a Crisis Committee

A Crisis Committee is a specialized form of Model United Nations that simulates a rapidly evolving, high-stakes environment where decisions and actions taken by delegates can immediately and fundamentally alter the course of events being discussed. Unlike traditional General Assembly committees, which focus primarily on long-term diplomatic solutions through resolutions, crisis committees are designed to replicate the urgency, unpredictability, and complexity found in real-world crises.

In a crisis committee, each delegate typically represents an individual—such as a government minister, military commander, or influential political figure—rather than a country. Delegates collaborate, negotiate, and strategize both inside ("front room") and outside ("back room") the formal committee setting. The front room involves speeches, debate, and the drafting of committee-wide actions (called "directives" rather than resolutions), while the back room (also known as "out-room") hosts private negotiations, secret crisis notes, and clandestine plots that can influence or change the main storyline.

The pace is intentionally fast and improvisational: delegates must be prepared to respond immediately to unexpected developments known as crisis updates; issued by the crisis staff, which may include breaking news, political upheaval, or sudden threats. The success of a delegate is often measured by their ability to think critically, act decisively, and adapt their strategies in real time to changing scenarios. In this way, crisis committees reward initiative, creativity, and the ability to multi-task under pressure.

Mandate and Powers

The mandate of a crisis committee is both broader and more flexible than that of a standard MUN committee. Crisis committees are empowered to:

- Make and implement executive decisions through directives, which are often immediately actionable and can alter the trajectory of the crisis as determined by the crisis staff (executive board of the committee)
- Bypass the lengthy, consensus-driven process of resolutions typical in General Assemblies, allowing small groups or sometimes even individuals to influence events and outcomes much more directly and quickly.
- Engage in committee-wide, group, or individual actions: Delegates may collectively draft and pass directives, collaborate in small factions, or pursue secret personal objectives through crisis notes submitted directly to the back room.
- Shape the simulation in real time: Through their actions, negotiations, and the resulting directives, delegates can trigger additional crisis updates, complicate scenarios for other actors, or even fundamentally reshape the nature of the crisis being debated.

Typical powers granted to the committee can include, but are not limited to:

- Deploying military forces, negotiating treaties, issuing communiqués, or organizing covert operations.
- Allocating resources, calling for emergency sessions, or imposing sanctions.
- Responding to unforeseen developments with new proposals or emergency measures at any time.

The crisis staff has significant discretion to interpret or respond to delegates' actions, ensuring the scenario remains fluid, challenging, and realistic. This system is designed to place a premium on initiative, strategic vision, and adaptability, making the crisis committee experience one of MUN's most dynamic and challenging settings.

Crisis Summary as of 30 September 1938

By the night of 30 September 1938, the situation in Europe had reached a critical breaking point. The fate of Czechoslovakia—and the fragile peace of the continent—hung in the balance. Adolf Hitler had issued escalating territorial demands regarding the Sudetenland, a region of western Czechoslovakia with a sizable ethnic German population. After a tense series of diplomatic confrontations, mobilizations, and threats, the governments of Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and France convened in Munich for urgent negotiations aimed at resolving the dispute and avoiding a descent into war.

Importantly, Czechoslovakia—the nation at the heart of the crisis—was excluded from the negotiations, as was its primary security guarantor, the Soviet Union. Under pressure from Britain and France, the Czechoslovak government signaled willingness to cooperate with the potential terms, despite widespread domestic opposition and massed military readiness. Meanwhile, Hungary and Poland began asserting their own territorial claims on Czechoslovak border regions, further complicating the geopolitical stakes. Armed skirmishes, mass mobilizations, and increasing propaganda campaigns were taking place across Central Europe.

At the Munich Conference, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, French Premier Édouard Daladier, German Chancellor Adolf Hitler, and Italian Duce Benito Mussolini attempted to finalize a diplomatic settlement. The proposed outcome involved ceding the Sudetenland to Germany in exchange for Hitler's promise not to pursue any further territorial ambitions. While British and French leaders viewed this as a last-ditch act to preserve peace, Hitler perceived the diplomatic gathering as an opportunity to extract maximum concessions without risking a full-scale conflict—yet he was fully prepared to go to war, should negotiations falter.

Urgency and Unresolved Questions

The crisis on 30 September 1938 is defined by extreme urgency and numerous unresolved questions. The situation is volatile, fluid, and highly susceptible to alteration based on the choices made in Munich. Key concerns include:

- Can war still be avoided? Germany is prepared to invade Czechoslovakia on 1 October 1938 unless a satisfactory diplomatic settlement is reached. Every hour of delay edges Europe closer to devastation.

- Will the Munich Agreement ensure lasting peace—or merely set the stage for further escalation? The Western powers argue that satisfying Hitler's current demands will stabilize Europe, while critics believe appeasement will embolden Nazi aggression.

- What legitimacy does the agreement hold when Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union are excluded? Without consultation or representation, a settlement may be seen as imposed or illegitimate, potentially causing future diplomatic fallout.

- What will be the response of the Czechoslovak government and military? Ceding the Sudetenland means surrendering their main fortifications and natural defenses. Would the government submit, resist, or collapse?

- Are Hitler's ambitions confined to the Sudetenland—or is this just one step in a broader expansionist agenda? European leaders are uncertain whether Hitler's promises of peace will hold any value.

- How will regional actors like Poland and Hungary exploit the situation? Their push for territorial revisions could spark additional disputes or even trigger localized conflicts.

- Has diplomacy reached its limit? With time running out and trust evaporating, the delegates at Munich face a make-or-break challenge: maintain European peace—or risk plunging the world into another devastating war.

Historical Background

Sudetenland & Czechoslovak Crisis Origins

The Sudetenland refers to the ethnically German-majority border regions of Czechoslovakia, including parts of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. Historically, this territory was not a unified administrative region but became collectively known as "Sudetenland" in the early 20th century, named after the Sudeten Mountains that stretch across the region. These areas had long been under Habsburg rule as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and had significant cultural, linguistic, and economic ties to the German-speaking world.

The aftermath of World War I and the disintegration of Austria-Hungary in 1918 saw the ally-supported creation of the new Czechoslovak Republic, a multi-ethnic state formed from Czech, Slovak, German, Hungarian, Ruthenian, and other populations. In this reordering of Central Europe under the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1919) and Treaty of Trianon (1920), over 3 million Sudeten Germans were incorporated into Czechoslovakia, despite widespread desire among them to be annexed to German-Austria or Germany itself. This incorporation ignited resentment and sowed the seeds of long-term instability.

Although the Czechoslovak Republic was among the more democratic and economically advanced states in postwar Europe, the Sudeten German minority increasingly viewed their position as inferior and marginalized. German grievances centered on linguistic, economic, and political marginalization, particularly in state administration and education. While Czechoslovakia offered minority protections and partial autonomy, many Sudeten Germans perceived these as inadequate. Tensions simmered throughout the 1920s and escalated dramatically in the 1930s, especially against the backdrop of the Great Depression, which struck ethnic German industrial regions more severely.

Major Developments Since 1933

The rise of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime in Germany in 1933 marked a turning point in Sudeten German politics. Hitler's foreign policy openly rejected the post–World War I international order, championing a radical nationalist program of Lebensraum, the reunification of all German-speaking peoples, and the eventual destruction of Czechoslovakia as a state. These ambitions were to be achieved through

a phased strategy of propaganda, subversion, diplomatic pressure, and, if necessary, war.

The Sudetendeutsche Partei (SdP), led by Konrad Henlein, emerged as the primary political representative of Sudeten Germans in the mid-1930s. Initially presenting itself as a moderate voice for autonomy, the SdP quickly aligned with German objectives and received covert support, coordination, and funding from the Nazi regime. Henlein's public demands focused on minority rights and federal reforms, but his private correspondence with Berlin revealed a deeper goal: to weaken and ultimately destabilize the Czechoslovak state from within.

By 1935, the SdP had become the largest party in Czechoslovakia overall, securing 15% of the national vote and campaigning heavily on grievances of historical injustice, unemployment, and cultural repression. Tensions escalated in subsequent years as the SdP increased its provocations and boycotts, while Germany intensified its propaganda influence in the region. Aggressive speeches by Hitler in 1937–1938 repeatedly declared that Germany would not tolerate the oppression of fellow Germans abroad.

The Hossbach Memorandum of November 1937—an internal German military meeting—revealed Hitler's plans to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia, even at the risk of war. The annexation of Austria in March 1938 (Anschluss) emboldened Hitler further and catastrophically heightened fears in Czechoslovakia about being the next target. German troops now shared a direct border with the Sudetenland, dramatically improving Germany's strategic position.

In response, Czechoslovakia undertook partial mobilization and began modernizing its military defenses. It relied on its formidable border fortifications distributed along the Sudetenland, modeled after the French Maginot Line, to deter German aggression. However, Czechoslovakia also remained dependent on support from its Western allies—primarily France, bound by a 1924 alliance, and its mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union, ratified in 1935.

Events Leading to the Conference

The first half of 1938 saw a steady progression of the crisis from political agitation to imminent military confrontation. Throughout April to September 1938, Henlein and the SdP, acting under German orders, gradually escalated demands for autonomy into open civil unrest, while Germany massed divisions along the border in thinly

disguised military exercises. Instances of riots, sabotage, local skirmishes, and forced evacuations became increasingly common. German radio and propaganda networks accused the Czech government of atrocities against German civilians—largely fabricated or exaggerated—to incite international condemnation.

In August, Britain dispatched Lord Runciman to mediate between the Czech government and the Sudeten Germans. Though he sought a peaceful compromise, Runciman's findings ended up favoring the German position and concluded that the Sudeten Germans' demands, although harsh, were rooted in valid feelings of exclusion.

By mid-September, the atmosphere in Central Europe was one of increasing fear and readiness for war. On 12 September, during the Nazi Party rally in Nuremberg, Hitler made a fiery speech condemning the treatment of Sudeten Germans and demanding "self-determination." Mass violence erupted immediately in the Sudetenland as SdP activists initiated uprisings, requiring swift suppression by the Czech military. On 15 September, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain flew to Hitler's mountain retreat in Berchtesgaden, seeking a negotiated settlement to the crisis. Hitler demanded the full annexation of the Sudetenland and insisted he would not back down.

After additional meetings in Bad Godesberg (22–23 September) failed to produce a peaceful agreement, mobilization orders were issued not only in Czechoslovakia but also in Germany, France, and Britain. Hitler issued an ultimatum: if the Sudetenland was not ceded to Germany by 1 October 1938, he would order a military invasion.

Faced with the clear threat of war, with their militaries unprepared and fearful of a repeat of World War I, Britain and France agreed to meet Hitler's demands. The governments of Germany, Italy, Britain, and France convened in Munich on 29 September 1938 in a last-ditch effort to resolve the matter diplomatically.

Crucially, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union were not invited to participate in the conference, despite being directly affected parties. Czechoslovakia was presented with the terms only after they had been agreed upon by the great powers. The conference aimed to finalize a diplomatic agreement—the Munich Agreement—that would transfer the Sudetenland to Germany and preserve peace in Europe. Whether such an agreement would maintain stability or catalyze further aggression remained to be seen.

Major Stakeholders

In the context of the Munich Conference and the Sudetenland crisis, the primary stakeholders consist of the four nations directly participating in the conference—Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy—as well as two excluded yet critically relevant powers, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Each stakeholder entered the crisis with different motivations, constraints, and strategic calculations that shaped the path toward the Munich Agreement and the future of Europe.

Germany (Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Government)

Germany, under Adolf Hitler's leadership, bore the central responsibility for escalating the Sudeten crisis and steering Europe toward the brink of war. Since coming to power in 1933, Hitler had systematically dismantled the Treaty of Versailles and pursued a policy of aggressive expansionism. His ultimate aim, articulated in Mein Kampf and reinforced through years of propaganda and rearmament, was to unite all ethnic Germans within a single Reich and expand Germany's Lebensraum (living space) in Eastern and Central Europe.

By 1938, Germany had rebuilt its military strength, reoccupied the Rhineland, and annexed Austria (Anschluss), largely without resistance from the Western powers. The crisis over the Sudetenland was a calculated next step. Hitler used the grievances of Sudeten Germans as a pretext to provoke instability in Czechoslovakia and justify territorial demands. Internally, Hitler sought both a foreign policy triumph and a potential military victory to bolster the Nazi regime's popularity and credibility.

Germany's objectives at the Munich Conference were to secure the Sudetenland through diplomatic concessions or, if necessary, by imminent invasion. Hitler presented the issue as his final territorial demand in Europe, but many in his inner circle and military leadership were aware of future plans to dismantle Czechoslovakia entirely and proceed toward Poland and beyond. Diplomatically, Hitler aimed to fracture the unity of Britain and France and test their willingness to stand up to German aggression.

United Kingdom (Neville Chamberlain)

The United Kingdom, led by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, approached the crisis with the overriding objective of preserving peace in Europe and avoiding

another world war. Still haunted by the trauma of the First World War and facing significant domestic opposition to rearmament, Britain pursued a policy of appeasement—acceding to some of Germany's demands in the hope of satisfying Hitler's ambitions and maintaining stability.

Chamberlain believed that Hitler's claims, couched in terms of self-determination for ethnic Germans, were reasonable. Convinced that war could only be avoided through direct negotiation, he traveled to Germany on multiple occasions in September 1938 and came to accept the idea of ceding the Sudetenland to Germany. At Munich, he positioned himself as a peace-broker, determined to prevent a slide into war by reaching a diplomatic solution, no matter how imperfect.

However, British military capabilities were not ready for a major continental war. Intelligence reports suggested that Germany had surpassed Britain in air power, and the public mood strongly favored compromise over confrontation. Chamberlain's hope was that by resolving this dispute peacefully, he could stabilize Europe and buy time for British rearmament.

France (Édouard Daladier)

France, under Prime Minister Édouard Daladier, was formally committed by treaty to defend Czechoslovakia in the event of an attack. Since 1924, France had maintained a mutual assistance pact with the Czechoslovak government, and French diplomacy had generally supported the post-Versailles order. However, by 1938, the French leadership was deeply divided on whether to honor this commitment.

France had suffered heavily during World War I and was politically fragmented, militarily cautious, and strategically reliant on British support. Daladier feared that a unilateral French defense of Czechoslovakia, without Britain, would be disastrous. Public opinion was staunchly anti-war, and the French military was not fully prepared for an offensive campaign against Germany.

At Munich, Daladier cooperated with Britain to reach a deal, ultimately agreeing to the German annexation of the Sudetenland without consulting Czechoslovakia. Although he viewed the agreement as a betrayal of a democratic ally, he felt France had no viable alternative and was unwilling to risk war without clear British backing. After returning from Munich, Daladier, unlike Chamberlain, did not claim victory, instead reportedly remarking, "The fools, why are they cheering?".

Italy (Benito Mussolini)

Italy, led by the Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, played a secondary yet strategically significant role at Munich. Though not a central party to the dispute, Mussolini acted as a mediator and portrayed himself as a peacemaker to boost his international prestige. In reality, Mussolini was a close ally of Hitler through the Rome-Berlin Axis but sought to avoid being overshadowed by Germany's growing dominance on the European stage.

Mussolini's proposal at the conference—drafted in cooperation with Germany—served to formalize the concession of the Sudetenland and was presented as a compromise. His role helped give the conference an appearance of multilateral diplomacy, although he remained broadly supportive of Hitler's goals.

Italy's broader aim was to strengthen its ties with Germany while preserving a degree of autonomy within the Axis partnership. Mussolini also used his role at Munich to bolster his domestic image as a powerbroker in Europe.

Czechoslovakia (Edvard Beneš – excluded from the negotiations)

Czechoslovakia, under President Edvard Beneš, was the state most directly and immediately affected by the Munich Conference. It had one of the strongest economies in Central Europe and a well-trained army, but its geopolitical position was precarious—surrounded by hostile neighbors and reliant on French and Soviet guarantees. The Sudetenland contained the bulk of Czechoslovakia's border fortifications, defense industries, and key infrastructure.

Czechoslovakia was not invited to participate in the Munich negotiations and was presented with the agreed terms afterward, essentially forced to either accept or face German invasion without Western support. This exclusion provoked outrage across the Czechoslovak population and military. President Beneš, recognizing that no effective military alliance could be relied upon, reluctantly accepted the terms on 30 September 1938 but resigned shortly afterward, humiliated by the betrayal.

For Czechoslovakia, the Munich Agreement marked not only the loss of territory but the destruction of its sovereignty, strategic defenses, and international credibility. The agreement sowed deep political and social distrust that would have lasting effects in the region and on future resistance movements.

Soviet Union (Joseph Stalin – excluded, but concerned)

The Soviet Union, led by Joseph Stalin, had signed a mutual assistance treaty with Czechoslovakia in 1935, pledging to assist in the event of German aggression—on the condition that France also acted. The Soviet Union viewed itself as a guardian of the Versailles order and saw Hitler's expansionism as a direct threat to Soviet interests. However, Soviet influence in Central Europe was limited, and its involvement in the crisis was diplomatically curtailed.

Soviet representatives were not invited to Munich, further marginalizing the USSR and stoking deep resentment in Moscow. Stalin interpreted the Western powers' decision to ignore the Soviet Union as evidence that Britain and France were trying to redirect German aggression eastward, toward a future invasion of the Soviet Union itself. This marginalization of Soviet diplomacy played a key role in Stalin's later decision to sign the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939.

Although officially expressing concern about the fate of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet response to the crisis was cautious and ambiguous. The Red Army was not adequately prepared for a war in Central Europe and had serious logistical challenges in reaching Czechoslovakia, especially given Poland and Romania's refusal to allow Soviet troops to pass through their territory.

Key Issues and Topics

The Munich Conference of September 29–30, 1938, brought fundamental political, territorial, and ethical questions to the forefront of European diplomacy. The stakes extended far beyond Czechoslovakia's borders, as leaders grappled with the risks of war, the fate of international agreements, and the legitimacy of appeasement as a strategy for peace. Below are the primary issues and topics debated at the conference and central to understanding the crisis.

Self-Determination and the Sudeten German Question

At the heart of the dispute was the principle of self-determination for ethnic Germans living in the Sudetenland. Germany justified its claims by citing the right of Germans who lived outside its national borders to join the Reich. British and French leaders recognized that the Sudetenland contained a majority German population—around three million people—and many accepted the idea, at least in theory, that regions with a majority should be allowed to determine their national allegiance. However, concerns remained about the rights of other minorities, such as Czechs and Jews, who would become marginalized or displaced in an imposed transfer.

Security and Alliances

The Sudetenland was critical to Czechoslovakia's security. Its loss meant surrendering well-fortified border defenses, arms factories, and key infrastructure. The weakening or collapse of Czechoslovakia jeopardized the security system in Central Europe that France and, by treaty, Britain had supported since World War I. The conference put severe strain on collective defense agreements and set a precedent for overriding treaties through crisis diplomacy.

Appeasement vs. Containment

A core issue was whether appeasement could buy peace or simply embolden Nazi Germany to make further demands. Britain and France, wary of another catastrophic war, wagered that meeting Hitler's territorial requests would stabilize Europe, especially since Germany's leader pledged to have "no more territorial demands" after the Sudetenland. Critics—both at the time and in later years—warned that giving in under threat would encourage further aggression, as happened when Hitler annexed the remainder of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and later invaded Poland.

Exclusion of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union

One of the Munich Conference's most controversial aspects was that Czechoslovakia—the state most affected—was excluded from negotiations and forced to accept terms set by larger powers. Similarly, the Soviet Union, which had a mutual

defense treaty with Czechoslovakia, was left out. This called into question the legitimacy of the settlement and sowed resentment and distrust in excluded countries.

Territorial Adjustments and Ethnic Minorities

The proposed and ultimately adopted agreement not only transferred the Sudetenland to Germany but also anticipated further changes along the borders, including Hungarian and Polish claims on Czech territory. The process of redrawing borders by external powers threatened to destabilize the broader region, leaving minority populations at risk of displacement, violence, and further revisionist claims.

Ultimatums and the Threat of War

As negotiations progressed, there was constant fear that failure would unleash an immediate German invasion and open a European war. Hitler set strict deadlines—demanding that the Sudetenland be evacuated and occupied by the German army in stages beginning October 1, 1938. Military mobilizations by Czechoslovakia, Britain, and France, combined with mass civilian anxieties, underlined the potential for catastrophic escalation if talks broke down.

The Aftermath and the Future of International Cooperation

The outcome at Munich undermined the credibility of collective security and set a critical precedent: that larger powers could decide the fate of smaller nations through negotiation without their input. It also exposed the weaknesses of the League of Nations and shattered the diplomatic confidence of those countries relying on international law for protection. The subsequent occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia by Germany in March 1939 confirmed the worst fears about the futility of appeasement and contributed directly to the outbreak of World War II.

Detailed Account of the Conference

Timeline: 29–30 September 1938

The Munich Conference took place over two intense days, with leaders and their advisers holding a series of private talks and group meetings. The major developments were as follows:

- 29 September, afternoon: Leaders of Germany (Adolf Hitler), Italy (Benito Mussolini), Great Britain (Neville Chamberlain), and France (Édouard Daladier) gather at the Führerbau, Munich. The main agenda is settled quickly—debating the transfer of the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia to Germany.
- Throughout the evening: Multiple rounds of closed-door negotiations occur, with Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano and other aides facilitating discussions as necessary. Mussolini presents a plan closely mirroring German proposals.
- 30 September, early morning: An agreement is reached. The drafted document determines that the Sudetenland will be ceded to Germany, with specific timelines and mechanisms for evacuation and occupation.
- Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union remain absent: Czech diplomats in Munich are only informed after core decisions are finalized. The agreement is presented as an ultimatum, and compliance is demanded.
- The agreement is signed in the early hours of 30 September. Chamberlain secures a separate statement from Hitler, purporting to guarantee future peace.

Main Negotiation Points

- The overarching debate centers around how to avoid a general European war while accommodating Germany's demand for the Sudetenland.
- Chamberlain and Daladier push for a peaceful, orderly transfer, with guarantees for the autonomy and protection of local non-German minorities.
- Hitler repeatedly threatens military intervention if the process is slow or the formal transfer is blocked.
- Mussolini mediates details between the parties, lending an air of collaborative diplomacy.
- French and British leaders seek written commitments from Hitler that the Sudetenland will be his last territorial demand.

Draft Proposals and Compromises

- The final agreement stipulates that German occupation of the Sudetenland will begin on 1 October 1938, to be completed in stages by 10 October.
- An international commission, including German, British, French, and Italian representatives, is set up to supervise both the transfer of territory and the handling of disputed areas.
- Guarantees are sought for the rights of Czechs and other minorities remaining in the territories affected by the transfer.
- Additional border questions, notably those involving Hungary and Poland, are to be pursued separately but underlined as concerns in the context of the Munich discussions.

Outcome and Immediate Aftermath

- The Munich Agreement requires the cession of all areas with a German-speaking majority (over 50%) to Germany. Evacuation and occupation are to be completed in less than two weeks.
- Chamberlain publicly declares he has achieved "peace for our time," but the relief in Western Europe is short-lived.
- The Agreement is received with horror and outrage in Czechoslovakia, where it is viewed as betrayal by the Western powers.
- Hitler is emboldened by the diplomatic victory, and both domestic and European critics fear that further revisionist demands are to come.
- The abandonment of Czechoslovakia marks a major blow to the credibility of collective security and the League of Nations, setting the stage for future crises and, ultimately, the Second World War.

Relevant Documents

Understanding the legal and diplomatic foundations of the Munich Agreement requires examining the key texts and public declarations made during the crisis. These documents illustrate not only the formal outcome of the conference but also the public rhetoric and assurances given—which in many cases did not match subsequent actions.

1. The Munich Agreement (30 September 1938)

Signed by Adolf Hitler (Germany), Neville Chamberlain (United Kingdom), Édouard Daladier (France), and Benito Mussolini (Italy), the Munich Agreement outlined the terms under which the Sudetenland would be ceded to Germany.

Key provisions included:

- The evacuation of Czechoslovak forces and administration from the Sudetenland beginning 1 October 1938.
- Full German occupation of the region by 10 October 1938.
- An international commission (Germany, UK, France, Italy) would determine specific zones of occupation and resolve disputes.
- Czechoslovakia was not a signatory to the agreement and was informed only after its conclusion.

The agreement stated that the four powers "consider the agreement as a final settlement of the Sudetenland question."

2. Annex to the Munich Agreement – International Commission and Minority Protections

An annex laid out further guidelines, including protections for Czechs and other minorities in the newly occupied territories.

- Those wishing to remain Czechoslovak citizens would be allowed to leave the Sudetenland.
- The commission would make further recommendations regarding disputed territories.
- Czechoslovakia was expected to complete the evacuation without delay or sabotage.

3. Anglo-German Declaration (30 September 1938 – Chamberlain-Hitler Statement)

After the conference, Chamberlain met with Hitler privately and the two signed a separate one-page declaration. Key lines read:

- "We regard the agreement signed last night... as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again."

- This statement was used by Chamberlain as the basis for his "peace for our time" speech.
- It was not legally binding and was later dismissed by Hitler.

4. Public Statements by Chamberlain and Daladier

- Chamberlain returned to Britain claiming he had secured peace, greeted with popular applause.
- Daladier, upon returning to France, observed that the French public was relieved but personally expressed deep regret over the Czechoslovak betrayal.
- Both leaders defended the agreement as necessary to avoid another catastrophic war.

5. Statements by the Czechoslovak Government

- President Edvard Beneš informed the public that the nation would accept the Munich Agreement under protest, emphasizing that they had no choice.
- A wave of national mourning, public outrage, and military demoralization followed.
- Beneš resigned shortly after and went into exile.