



JOINT HISTORIC
WAR COUNCIL -
AURANGZEB
BACKGROUND GUIDE

FARMAN FROM THE DARBAR-E-AZAM

Imperial Forward Camp, near Purandar Fort

Rabi' al-awwal, 1075 Hijri / March, 1665 CE

To the Honoured Sardars, Mansabdars, Faujdaars, and Commanders of the Deccan Campaign,

By the decree of His Imperial Majesty **Alamgir Aurangzeb**, the standard of the Mughal Empire advances upon the turbulent hills of the Deccan. The Maratha rebel, **Shivaji Bhonsle**, continues his defiance from the rugged forts of Purandar, Rajgad, and beyond. His challenge to the empire must now meet a decisive response.

Under the supreme military leadership of **Raja Jai Singh I of Amber**, appointed Commander of the Southern Expedition, a **Joint War Council** is hereby convened. Your counsel and arms are summoned for deliberation and deployment in the siege of **Purandar**.

This Council shall function under the direct authority of the **Darbar-e-Azam**, as custodian of imperial strategy and guardian of Hindustan's unity. The protocols of the **Fatawa-e-Alamgiri**, the military jurisprudence of our ancestors, and the martial experience of the Empire shall guide our hand.

Enclosed is a compiled dossier — containing **fort schematics, troop placements, intelligence from captured Maratha correspondence**, and maps prepared by imperial cartographers, drawn from the **State Archives and the Diwan-e-Insha**.

Let every officer carry the burden of honour. This is no ordinary campaign — it is the reassertion of **Shahi Qanoon** over rebellion.

With the Emperor's seal above us and the sword of justice before us, let us deliver Hindustan from discord.

Padshah-e-Ghazi, Zill-e-Ilahi

— By Order of the Darbar-e-Azam

Issued under the authority of Padshah Aurangzeb Alamgir

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE BATTLE

Background to the Aurangzeb War Council (March, 1665)

The **Aurangzeb War Council** refers to the strategic high-command assembly summoned in **March 1665**, under the leadership of **Mirza Raja Jai Singh I**, at the order of **Emperor Alamgir Aurangzeb**, in preparation for a decisive offensive against **Shivaji Bhonsle**. Convened near the frontlines of **Purandar**, the council included **Rajput mansabdars**, **Afghan generals**, **imperial artillery officers**, and **Persianate bureaucrats**, all working to execute the Mughal campaign to reclaim imperial control over the Deccan.

This council was not merely military — it was diplomatic, logistical, and ideological, combining **Islamic imperial jurisprudence**, Mughal siege warfare, and **intelligence coordination**, all aimed at subduing the Swarajya movement led by Shivaji.

Official Timeline (as per Imperial Farmans and Archives)

Year	Key Event
1664	Shivaji sacks Surat; Aurangzeb outraged by breach of imperial prestige
Jan 1665	Raja Jai Singh appointed Commander-in-Chief of Deccan Campaign (Diwan-e-Insha)
Mar 1665	War Council convened near Saswad to plan siege of Purandar
31 Mar 1665	Siege of Purandar begins with artillery batteries and strategic encirclement

Why Purandar Was Targeted

According to **Persian Records, Vol. 6 (National Archives of India)**:

- Purandar served as Shivaji's strongest hill fort south of Pune.
 - Its capture would rupture the Maratha supply chain and create panic across Swarajya.
 - As a symbolic bastion, its fall would demoralize local resistance.
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Council Objectives & Targets

The War Council resolved to:

- Launch sequential sieges on **Kondhana**, **Rajgad**, **Rohida**, then **Purandar**.
- Coordinate with **Bijapuri Siddis** for support in the southern theatre.
- Use diplomacy selectively to fracture Maratha alliances (Ref: Aurangzeb Nama, Vol. III).

Key Personalities at the Council

- **Mirza Raja Jai Singh I** – Supreme Commander, Deccan
- **Diler Khan** – Subedar of Malwa, siege specialist
- **Shaista Khan (correspondence)** – Strategic advisor from Bengal
- **Rajput Generals** – Mansab of 5,000+, provided cavalry and infantry divisions
- **Imperial Cartographers & Scribal Court (Munshis)** – Prepared maps, siege orders, and coded communications

Imperial Goals

- Reassert Mughal sovereignty across the Western Ghats
- Break Shivaji’s logistical and psychological defense
- Prepare terms of surrender and pre-draft treaty clauses (used later in the Treaty of Purandar)

Strategic Considerations

- Intelligence suggested Shivaji’s internal supply chains were weakening.
- Use of psychological warfare and offers of jagirs to defectors was prioritized.
- Siege artillery placements focused on Vajragarh plateau to neutralize lower defenses first.

Primary Government Sources Used:

1. **National Archives of India – Persian Records Collection, Vol. 6 (Letters of Mughal Subedars)**
2. **Diwan-e-Insha Farmans**, compiled under Aurangzeb’s court scribes
3. **Maharashtra State Gazetteers – Pune District, 1982 Edition**
4. **Aurangzeb Nama – Vol. II and III**, trans. Sir Jadunath Sarkar
5. **ASI Report on Mughal Military Architecture in the Deccan (2020)**

POLITICAL AND MILITARY LANDSCAPE

Prepared for the Joint Strategic Assembly at the Imperial Forward Camp near Purandar

The campaign against Shivaji Bhonsle is not a mere frontier suppression. It reflects a broader contest for control over the Deccan — a region fractured between imperial authority, rebellious hill chiefs, and crumbling sultanates. This report, drawn from official Mughal records, offers a situational understanding for each officer in this High War Council.

A. Mughal Imperial Objectives in the

Ordered directly by **Alamgir Aurangzeb**, the southern campaign's goals were:

- Suppress the Shivaji rebellion** and recover all forts unlawfully held.
- Secure Konkan ports** for trade and imperial naval control.
- Restore Mughal prestige** after Shivaji's 1664 raid on Surat.
- Contain Bijapur and Golconda**, preventing their support to local warlords.

Commander-in-Chief: **Raja Jai Singh I**, vested with full autonomy via imperial firman.

B. Mughal Strategic Advantage vs Challenges

Factor	Strengths	Limitations
Manpower	12,000+ troops; elite Rajput and Afghan contingents	Spread thin across 32 targets; terrain favours defenders
Artillery	Advanced siege cannons and heavy batteries	Difficult transport in ravines and ghats
Diplomacy	Use of imperial farmans to negotiate surrenders	Distrust among local zamindars
Intelligence	Espionage by converted locals, imperial spies in Pune region	Shivaji's counter-intelligence under Bahrji Naik
Morale	Backed by imperial will and prestige of Delhi court	Harsh climate, unfamiliar terrain, and guerrilla resistance

C. Political Theatre: Allies and Adversaries

Allies

- **Siddis of Janjira** – Provide naval strength and fort access via Konkan
- **Defectors from Maratha ranks** – Promised jagirs and amnesty
- **Bijapur (unofficial)** – Though not aligned, did not aid Shivaji due to Mughal pressure

Adversaries

- **Shivaji Bhonsle** – De facto hill king, not recognized by Mughal court
- **Local Deshmukhs in Sahyadri region** – Support Shivaji due to economic interest
- **Golconda** – Diplomatic but militarily neutral; fears Aurangzeb’s wrath

D. Mughal Command Structure

- **Raja Jai Singh I** – Commander-in-Chief
- **Diler Khan** – Deputy Commander
- **Afghan Cavalry Chiefs** – Border and mobile strike units
- **Abyssinian Units** – Siege engineers, allied via Siddi naval pact
- **Diwan, Bakshi & Qiladars** – Oversaw logistics, salaries, and fort garrisons

E. Primary Military Targets (Strategic Focus: Pune Region)

Fort	Strategic Value	Status (March 1665)
Purandar	Key to Pune; symbol of Shivaji's resistance	Under active siege
Rajgad	Shivaji's capital; royal court location	Reinforced, not yet encircled
Kondhana	Access to Pune-Kalyan trade corridor	Vulnerable to assault
Rohida	Southern approach; supplies outposts	Partially blockaded
Vajragarh	Controls lower ridge of Purandar	Captured by Mughal forces

F. Terrain, Climate & Logistics (Imperial Survey, Subah Deccan)

- **Climate:** Hot and dry; March–June sees rising temperatures and dust-laden winds
- **Terrain:** Treacherous hills, narrow ridges, ideal for ambushes

- **Logistics:** Water scarcity in Mughal camps; supply lines stretched through Saswad and Ahmednagar
 - **Transport:** Artillery hauled using elephants and reinforced carts; slow movement in rocky valleys
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Primary Government Sources Referenced:

1. National Archives of India – Persian Records, Vol. 6 (1665 Campaign Dispatches)
 2. Diwan-e-Insha – Imperial Farmans of Aurangzeb’s Deccan Office
 3. Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency – Poona District (1885)
 4. Maharashtra State Gazetteers, 1982 – Fortification Records
 5. ASI Report – Mughal Fort Campaigns in the Western Ghats (2020)
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This complex theatre — balancing siege warfare, diplomacy, and topography — sets the stage for this Council’s decisions. Let the imperial standard fly higher than ever before.

Zafar ba Hukm-e-Padshah.

Victory, by the Emperor’s Command.

STRUCTURE AND ROLE OF THE AURANGZEB WAR COUNCIL

Unlike the swift and mobile Maratha councils, the **Aurangzeb War Council** was a **formally structured and hierarchical command apparatus**, deeply entrenched in **Persian administrative tradition** and guided by **Shariah-aligned imperial codes**, **Timurid military doctrines**, and the **strategic jurisprudence of the Fatawa-e-Alamgiri**.

This dossier outlines the **composition, wartime roles, and deliberation structure** of the Mughal War Council convened under **Raja Jai Singh I** at the imperial forward base near **Purandar**.

A. Supreme Authority: Alamgir Aurangzeb

- All campaigns in the Deccan operated under the **imperial firman** of the Emperor.
- Final authority lay with **Aurangzeb**, but operational command was delegated to **Mirza Raja Jai Singh I**, who acted *fi hukm-e-padshah* (by royal decree).
- Decisions were informed by **Quranic injunctions**, **courtly protocol**, and the **legacy of Akbar and Shah Jahan's administrative manuals**.

B. Core Structure of the War Council (Shura-e-Jang)

Position/Title	Role in the War Council
Raja Jai Singh I	<i>Amir-ul-Umara</i> , Commander-in-Chief of the Deccan Campaign
Diler Khan	Deputy Commander; tactical field marshal
Bakshi-ul-Mulk	Head of recruitment, payments, and camp discipline
Mir Munshi	Recorder of all firmans, battle dispatches, and correspondence
Qazi-ul-Quzat	Legal advisor; interprets Islamic laws of warfare
Diwan-e-Subah	Finance; ensures war expenses, camp provisions
Waqia-Navis	Intelligence recorders; maintain daily war diaries
Faujdar-e-Khas	Deployed elite imperial cavalry and infantry coordination

C. Additional Invitees & Regional Stakeholders

Based on translated Persian records (NAI: Persian Records, 1665 Vol. 6):

- **Subedars of Ahmadnagar and Khandesh** – Reported on local resistance and tribute collections.
 - **Siddi Commanders of Janjira** – Represented naval interests and sea fort supply operations.
 - **Rajput Sardars (e.g. Rathores, Sisodias)** – Held mansabs and led ground units from the north.
 - **Envoys from Bijapur and Golconda** – Present for intelligence sharing and diplomatic optics.
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D. Deliberation & Decision Protocol

Imperial war protocol mandated the following steps:

1. Council opened with invocation of **Bismillah-ir-Rahman-ir-Rahim**.
 2. Jai Singh or the Bakshi presented enemy intelligence (spy reports, intercepted Maratha letters).
 3. Strategic options were debated — siege order, terrain advantages, enemy psychology.
 4. Legal counsel from the **Qazi** ensured **compliance with Islamic war conduct**.
 5. The final decision was signed under the **Emperor's name**, sealed by the Munshi.
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E. Rules of Engagement & Ethical Code

As per **Fatawa-e-Alamgiri** and **Mansabdari** code:

- Surrendered forces to be spared unless guilty of treason.
 - Civilian quarters and temples avoided unless they housed weapons.
 - Defection by enemy sardars rewarded with *jagir grants and rank*.
 - Religious tolerance was to be maintained for propaganda optics.
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F. Emergency Powers and Command Flexibility

- **Raja Jai Singh** could negotiate terms or offer peace on behalf of Aurangzeb.
- In battlefield emergencies, **Faujdars and Diler Khan** had autonomy for tactical redeployment.

- Reinforcements and war funds could be drawn from imperial treasuries in Aurangabad.
 - Siege artillery could be requisitioned from Gujarat, if delays threatened campaign timeline.
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G. Secrecy, Communication & Security

- **Messages encrypted** in Persian and passed via hawala channels.
 - Double-agents were deployed in Maratha strongholds disguised as **converted Brahmins or wandering fakirs**.
 - Breach of imperial war deliberations was punishable by **imprisonment or execution** under imperial edict.
 - Letters to the Emperor were bound in silk, wax-sealed, and personally verified by the Munshi.
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Summary: A Court of Steel and Scrolls

The Aurangzeb War Council blended **Persianate bureaucracy**, **Islamic law**, and **Rajput martial ethics** into a coherent war engine. While formal and hierarchical, it was capable of calculated diplomacy and ruthless military efficiency.

“Ba hukm-e-Shahenshah-e-Hind – Zafar ast lazim.”

(By the will of the Emperor of Hindustan — victory is imperative.)

STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF FORCES

(MARATHA & MUGHAL)

As compiled from the Maharashtra State Gazetteers, National Archives of India, Ministry of Culture & ASI Reports

The siege of **Purandar** was not merely a confrontation of armies — it was a calculated collision of **tactical asymmetry**, **terrain warfare**, and **logistical resilience**. On one side stood a rugged, mobile, morale-driven Maratha force led by Shivaji; on the other, a powerful, structured, artillery-backed Mughal imperial army led by Raja Jai Singh I.

A. Maratha Military Configuration

Unit Type	Estimated Strength	Deployment Purpose
Light Cavalry (Bargirs)	~6,000	Mobile strikes, hit-and-run raids across Ghats
Infantry (Hetkaris)	~8,500	Fort garrisons, ridge patrols, ambush warfare
Guerrilla Units (Mavalas)	~2,000	Disrupted Mughal supply lines, sabotage units
Fort Garrison (Purandar)	~1,200 under Murarbaji	Held core defenses of Purandar & Vajragarh
Naval Scouts (Konkan)	~400	Monitored Siddi activity, coastal blockades

◆ **Total Maratha War Capacity: Approx. 17,000–18,000**

Key Commanders:

- Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj** – Supreme strategist, stationed at Rajgad
- Murarbaji Deshpande** – Kiledar of Purandar; martyrdom symbol

- **Bahirji Naik** – Espionage chief, led spy rings and internal disruption

B. Maratha Arms & Fort Supplies

Equipment	Description	Source
Tulwar	Curved sabres used in open-field and close combat	ASI Kolhapur Armory Report
Bhala (Spear)	Short-range thrusting weapon for fort defense	Rajgad Excavations
Dhanush-Baan	Traditional bows for silent, high-ground attacks	Tribal Warfare Manuals
Muskets	Limited stock, acquired via Portuguese smugglers	Surat-Portugese Logs, 1650s
Light Cannons	8 bronze cannons with 150–200m range	ASI Survey – Purandar Fort

Supplies:

- **Food & Grain:** Stock for 1,000 men for 90 days
- **Water Reserves:** ~20,000 litres in cisterns
(Source: Maharashtra Gazetteers – Fort Design Records)

C. Mughal Imperial Forces under Raja Jai Singh I

Unit Type	Estimated Strength	Deployment Notes
Cavalry (Savars)	~6,000	Rajput and Afghan horsemen, shock deployment
Infantry	~5,000	Musketeers, sword infantry, shield-bearing footmen
Artillery Units	~30 cannons	Siege and long-range bombardment units
War Elephants	~200	Logistics, battering operations, heavy haulage
Camel Scouts	~500	Terrain navigation, desert communication
Siege Engineers	~100	Built trenches, gun platforms, mines beneath walls

◆ **Total Mughal Contingent:** Approx. **12,000–13,000**
Backup units were positioned at **Saswad** and **Kondhana**.

Command Hierarchy:

- **Mirza Raja Jai Singh I** – Commander-in-Chief, Rajput warlord
- **Diler Khan** – Led frontline siege operations, known for brutality

D. Imperial Artillery & Siege Mechanics

- **Cannons Used:** Long-range field guns like *Bajrang* and *Narachastra*
- **Gun Emplacements:** Built on **Vajragarh ridge**, aimed downward at fort walls
- **Engineering Tactics:**
 - **Sappers** dug tunnels beneath the bastions
 - **Gun ramps** fashioned from wood, stone, and soil

- **Continuous bombardment** breached outer walls by mid-May 1665

(Ref: Fort Diary, NAI Persian Vol. VI)

E. Logistical Constraints on Both Sides

Constraint	Maratha Camp	Mughal Camp
Water Supply	Tank-fed, rationed; vulnerable to drought	River-fed, exposed to ambushes
Food Rations	Grain from Rajgad and Chauth collections	Dependent on supply lines from Saswad
Medical Aid	Local vaidyas, herbal poultices	Field hospitals with Persian hakims
Troop Movement	Agile, rotated via hill passes	Slow in rough terrain, reliant on elephants

F. Comparative Military Advantage

Factor	Marathas	Mughals
Terrain Use	Excellent knowledge, guerrilla mastery	Heavy artillery, siege specialization
Morale	High; inspired by Bhavani Devi and Swarajya	Disciplined under imperial firman

Factor	Marathas	Mughals
Intel Network	Extensive, run by Bahirji Naik	Relied on deserters and local informants
Troop Numbers	Higher (~18,000), but dispersed	Fewer (~13,000), but concentrated & trained
Supply Chain	Localized, flexible	Centralized, more exposed to disruption

Primary Sources Consulted

1. Maharashtra State Gazetteers – Military Chapters (1982)
2. Archaeological Survey of India – Fort Armament Reports (Purandar, 1984)
3. National Archives of India – Persian Records, Vol. VI (Siege Dispatches)
4. Ministry of Defence – Mughal Deccan Campaign Compendium (2021)
5. Peshwa Daftar (Desh-Vibhag Lekh) – Pune Archives

STRATEGY, FORTIFICATIONS, LOGISTICS, AND SUPPLY CHAINS

Prepared for the War Council of His Majesty Alamgir Aurangzeb

By Order of the Mansabdars & Subedars of the Deccan | Freeze Date: March 1665

The siege of **Purandar** was a critical milestone in the **Mughal Southern Campaign**, sanctioned under the imperial **Farman of Shahenshah Aurangzeb Alamgir**. The engagement was not a mere matter of conquest, but a calculated imperial maneuver to neutralize the growing threat of **Shivaji Bhonsle**, who had undermined Mughal prestige by plundering Surat and capturing forts across the Deccan.

This dossier outlines military strategy, siege operations, terrain challenges, and coordination protocols for commanders present in the War Council of Aurangzeb, assembled under the direction of **Mirza Raja Jai Singh I**.

A. Objective of the Imperial Campaign

Imperial Directives (Farman, February 1665):

- Capture Purandar**, and thereafter Rajgad and other rebel-held forts.
- Reintegrate 23 Maratha forts** into Mughal control.
- Suppress the Bhonsle rebellion** diplomatically or militarily.
- Secure Konkan coastlines** to protect trade and block Siddi-Maratha alliances.

B. Status of the Rebel Fort (Intelligence from Faujdar Diler Khan)

Feature	Intelligence Summary
Altitude	4,472 ft above sea level — highly defensible
Structure	Twin forts — <i>Purandar</i> (main) and <i>Vajragarh</i> (secondary, now under control)
Defense Lines	Triple-walled with zigzagging ascent trails
Garrison	~1,200 men under Murarbaji Deshpande , elite hill-fort defenders
Supplies	3-month stockpile of grain and water (as per intercepted reports)
Escape Routes	Underground tunnel leads toward Saswad forest — must be blocked

C. Deployment of Imperial Forces (As of March 1665)

Unit	Strength	Notes
Cavalry (Savars)	~6,000	Rajput and Afghan detachments; fast-response wings
Infantry	~5,000	Mughal matchlock men, archers, and sword units
Artillery Corps	30+ cannons	Heavy siege guns from Burhanpur and Mir Jumla's depot
Elephant Corps	200+	For hauling siege towers, dragging artillery uphill
Engineers & Sappers	~100	Digging trenches, destabilizing wall foundations
Logistics Division	Separate teams	Based at Saswad, Kondhana, and Baramati

D. Siege Engineering & Tactical Operations

- **Encampment Zone:** Fortified Mughal camp ~3 km from Vajragarh base.
 - **Trench Lines:** Parallel approach trenches built to deploy cannon platforms safely.
 - **Siege Towers:** Mounted with cannons, pulled by elephants toward fort gates.
 - **Tunnel Warfare:** Sappers deployed to breach walls from beneath — multiple shafts dug in May 1665.
 - **Psychological War:** Jai Singh dispatched envoys urging surrender under “generous imperial pardon.”
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E. Terrain and Climate Challenges (Govt. Survey & Army Reports)

- **Season:** Pre-monsoon months — hot, dry, with risks of water exhaustion.
 - **Topography:** Rocky ghats and cliffs made artillery transport and cannon recoil difficult.
 - **Maratha Tactics:** Repeated sabotage of Mughal supply lines using ambush units in valleys and ravines.
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F. Operational Obstacles & Risks Noted by Council

Challenge	Mitigation Strategy
Supply Ambushes	Reinforce routes via Kondhana & Baramati with additional foot patrols
Peasant Hostility	Raja Jai Singh ordered no plundering to win over local support
Weather Risk	Aim to conclude siege before June rains; artillery prone to misfire
Internal Defection	False letters from Shivaji uncovered — implement messenger screening
Spy Networks	Maratha agents posing as fakirs/traders — thorough background checks enforced

G. Royal Command Structure for the Operation

Rank/Title	Officer
Imperial Commander-in-Chief	Raja Jai Singh I of Amber
Assault Vanguard	Diler Khan
Logistics Control	Mansabdars under Saswad fort
Siege Engineering Head	Appointed from Mir Jumla's technical corps
Court Reporting	Reports transmitted to Aurangzeb biweekly via Burhanpur courier network

H. Counter-Propaganda & Diplomacy

- Raja Jai Singh engaged in diplomatic correspondence with Shivaji, urging surrender while ensuring **honourable terms**.
 - Conditions included: return of key forts, vassal status, and formal recognition under the Mughal Empire.
 - Intelligence intercepts revealed Shivaji's hesitation due to internal supply strain and fear of betrayal by Bijapur.
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Primary Imperial Records Consulted:

1. **National Archives of India – Persian Records Collection (Vol. VI, 1665)**
 2. **Mughal War Manuals – “Fatwa-i-Alamgiri” (Military Directives Section)**
 3. **ASI Reports on Deccan Fortifications**
 4. **Survey of India Topographic Reports – Deccan Operations, 17th Century**
 5. **Imperial Gazetteer (1885) – Deccan Military Affairs Section**
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This campaign was more than a military confrontation — it was a matter of **imperial reputation, commercial control, and Deccan dominion**. The **Aurangzeb War Council**, in March 1665, stood not just to take a fort — but to send a message across the subcontinent: **Imperial order shall prevail.**

INTELLIGENCE, TERRAIN, AND GEOGRAPHY OF PURANDAR

Victory in Hindustan is seldom won by sword alone. The siege of Purandar demanded mastery over the Deccan terrain, deployment of covert informants, and disruption of Shivaji's mountain warfare. This intelligence digest was compiled to brief the Imperial Court of Aurangzeb Alamgir on geographic challenges, guptachari (spying networks), and tribal sympathies affecting the imperial advance.

A. Terrain & Topography Overview (Ref: Survey & Sketch by Mughal Sappers, March 1665)

Feature	Description
Coordinates	18.27°N, 73.96°E
Altitude	~4,472 feet (Purandar) / ~3,800 feet (Vajragarh)
Terrain	Rocky ridges, zigzag trails, vertical escarpments
Climate	Arid summer (36–38°C); early thunderclouds forming
Strategic Sites	Saswad, Narayanpur, and the forest belts near Taradgaon

B. Tactical Geography: Hazards to the Imperial Army

Terrain Feature	Threat to Imperial Troops
Steep Ravines	Restricted elephant and camel movement
Ghats & Khinds	Ambush-prone, ideal for Shivaji's light cavalry
Forest Belts	Covered Maratha guerrilla attacks on food convoys
Hilltop Fort Walls	Out of range for low-ground artillery fire
Monsoon Signs	Risk of trench collapse, soggy ammunition

C. Guptacharya and Espionage Encounters

(Ref: Diwan-i-Insha letters from Pune subah, March 1665)

- Bahirji Naik, a famed Maratha agent, reportedly commands 20+ disguised informants.
- Mughal spies infiltrated hill bazaars posing as Fakirs and Persian physicians.
- **Sabotage Attempt Foiled:** A Mughal informant named "Meherban" identified a plot to burn food supplies at Saswad granary — averted on 22 March.

D. Tactical Disruptions Noted (Purandar Vicinity)

Incident	Date	Mughal Countermeasure
Burnt gunpowder wagons (Saswad)	17 March 1665	Re-routed convoys via Jejuri with Rajput escort
False surrender letter planted	19 March 1665	Letter traced to Jadhav camp, messenger executed
Rolling boulders on ghats	Continuous	Cavalry dismounted during ghat patrols

E. Meteorological Risk (IMD-Historic Reconstruction + British Army Logs)

- Rainfall in last week of March exceeded average: **artillery wheels stuck in wet soil.**
- Canvas tents in outer trench camps rotting due to high humidity.
- **Lightning Strike Reported:** 25 March near Saswad ridge injured 2 camel drivers.

F. Observed Maratha Weaknesses

Imperial Intelligence Finding	Tactical Recommendation
Shivaji reliant on local granaries	Conduct scorched-earth raids post-surrender
Maratha runners use narrow goat paths	Block khinds with sapper-laid traps
Fort morale tied to Bhavani worship schedule	Use stormy weather to attack during rituals

G. Imperial Communication Systems

- **Fire Beacons:** Between Saswad camp and Kondhana station.
- **Morse Drums:** Installed at trench stations for silent signaling during night patrols.
- **Rohilkhand Couriers:** Transmit sealed reports to Aurangzeb’s court every 4 days.

Sources Consulted for War Council Presentation:

- 1. Persian Dispatches of Raja Jai Singh I to Aurangzeb (Vol. VI) – National Archives of India**
- 2. Deccan Subah Roznamcha – Military Campaign Diaries (Mughal)**
- 3. Maharashtra Gazetteer – Topography Cross-Reference (translated for Deccan Subah)**
- 4. British Meteorological Reconstructions – 1665 Monsoon Onset Records**
- 5. Mughal Secretariats – Fort Geography Maps (based on Survey of India Charts)**

INTERNAL DYNAMICS AND COMMANDER LOYALTY

Victory over Shivaji's resistance rests not only on siege warfare, but on penetrating his leadership circle. Our observers noted internal fissures among the Maratha Sardars that may be exploited for imperial advantage. The following brief offers key assessments for diplomatic outreach, targeted bribes, or misinformation campaigns.

A. Supreme Maratha Authority: Shivaji Bhonsle

- Presides over War Councils directly at Rajgad.
- Issues **Nishan** (mandate letters) invoking divine sanction of Bhavani Devi.
- Known to override clan divisions** with merit-based promotions (irregular by Deccan feudal norms).
- Maintains firm grip over **Deshmukhs**, using land titles and temple donations to ensure loyalty.

B. Key Maratha Commanders & Imperial Status Notes

Commander	Current Role (1665)	Vulnerability/Status (Mughal Report)
Murarbaji Deshpande	Commander of Purandar Fort	Declared martyr if killed; high morale risk
Netaji Palkar	Cavalry head; leads ghat ambushes	Bribe attempts failed; loyal to Shivaji
Bahirji Naik	Intelligence chief; mobile units	Subject of capture bounty since 1664
Yesaji Kank	Rearguard commander at Rajgad	Target for coded false flag letters
Jadhav of Phaltan	Noble house with divided sympathies	Candidate for diplomacy, noted in Farman

C. Maratha Factions Identified (Ref: Desh-Vibhag Lekh)

Clan / Sardar Group Loyalty		Recommendation
Bhonsles of Satara	Loyal	Monitor for over-extension
Mohite of Konkan	Loyal	Grain handlers; may be bribed
Jadhavs of Phaltan	Divided	Engage via local envoy
Mores of Javli	Historical rivals	Message through Mahadev temple network

D. Maratha Council Disputes (as intercepted by Mughal informants)

- **Open-field attack vs Fort delay strategy** debated in Shivaji’s camp.
 - **Faction 1** (Deshpande, Palkar): Advocates martyrdom and full resistance.
 - **Faction 2** (Annaji Datto): Proposes tactical diplomacy.
Shivaji reportedly **tilted toward diplomatic options** but maintained siege defense for negotiation leverage.
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E. Loyalty Testing & Purge by Shivaji (As per March 1665 letters)

- **Two guards at Vajragarh** executed on suspicion of betrayal.
 - **Night roll calls introduced**, officer movements restricted post-dusk.
 - **Intercepted letter** bearing Mughal code resulted in court martial at Rajgad.
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F. Morale & Incentive System in Maratha Camp

- Shivaji awarded *war shares* to frontline defenders.
 - Bhavani Devi pujas performed weekly; seen as a morale anchor.
 - Grain rations doubled for families of soldiers stationed at Purandar.
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Primary Records Used in Report Compilation:

1. **Sabhasad Bakhar** (Translated & Reframed for Mughal Use)
2. **Mughal Roznamcha** – Intercepted Correspondence File (Vol. IX)
3. **Farmans from Aurangzeb’s Diwan-i-Arz** – On Recruitment and Diplomacy
4. **Desh-Vibhag Lekh** (Annotated by Deccan Subedar Office, March 1665)

5. Jadhav Family Records (Seized at Kondhana, Feb 1665)

AURANGZEB WAR COUNCIL DOSSIER

Subject: *Assessment of Maratha War Council Decisions & Ethical Framework at Purandar Fort*

Prepared For: *His Imperial Majesty's Diwan-i-Khas*

Freeze Date: *End of Sha'ban 1075 Hijri / March 1665 CE*

Compiled By: *Imperial Intelligence Bureau, Deccan Subah*

PRE-SIEGE ASSESSMENT OF SHIVAJI BHONSLE'S WAR COUNCIL DECISIONS

A. Anticipated Rejection of Diplomatic Terms

| Date of Report | March 3, 1665 |

- Envoy **Mir Abdul Ghaffar** was dispatched with an imperial offer to Shivaji Bhonsle:
 - Recognition as jagirdar under the Mughal crown
 - Retention of 5 hill forts
 - Cessation of raids in return for tax autonomy
- Informants embedded in Rajgad (ref: Bahirji intercepts) **confirm rejection likelihood**. Shivaji reportedly said:

"A lion does not sell his den to save his skin."

Council Assessment: High probability of war, no peaceful resolution likely before summer.

B. Rapid Fortification of Purandar and Vajragarh

| Date of Observation | March 9–20, 1665 |

- Purandar fort garrison increased by **300 troops** under **Murarbaji Deshpande**
 - Defensive architecture reinforced:
 - Zigzag access paths** barricaded
 - Watch towers activated (Mahadev Buruj, Narayan Buruj)
 - New trenches and cannon placements** observed on upper plateau
- Imperial Suggestion:** Siege planning must factor in **fort self-sustainability** for 2–3 months

C. Intensification of Espionage and Counter-Intelligence

| Source: Bahirji Naik Dispatches |

- Shivaji's intelligence officer **Bahirji Naik** observed sending:
 - Disguised bards and fakirs** into Mughal-controlled villages
 - Teen couriers trained to mimic temple pilgrims, carrying coded scrolls

- Intercepts suggest use of **fake surrender letters** to test Mughal reaction and troop rotation

Imperial Action: Establish **double-layer vetting** of local informants near Saswad, Jejuri, and Baramati

D. Guerrilla Preparations Along Saswad-Junnar Axis

| Field Notes from Fasadl Khansamas |

- Light cavalry spotted rehearsing ambush drills** in the ghats east of Rajgad
 - Maratha stables near Maval villages** reportedly mobilizing horses for disruption raids
 - Grain hoarding and field burning observed in Purandar's support villages
- Council Projection:** Sabotage of imperial logistics expected by early May
-

E. Relocation of Supply Stockpiles to Mountain Redoubts

| Date Verified | March 25, 1665 |

- Shivaji's quartermasters (under Annaji Datto) stockpiled:
 - Gunpowder from Janjira via Konkan** (via salt-smuggler routes)
 - 40,000+ litres** of rainwater stored in Purandar's rock tanks
 - Salt, lime, and rope deliveries confirmed via **Mahadev Khind trail**
- Imperial Risk:** Siege delay beyond 45 days may lead to **stalemate unless supply chain is disrupted**
-

F. Diplomatic Defiance and Religious Invocation Strategy

- Intelligence confirms internal councils at Rajgad involved:
 - Oaths taken on Bhavani Devi idols**
 - Use of shlokas and panchang to determine battle timings
 - Shivaji is **aligning resistance with dharma symbolism**, aiming to morally unite all Sardars
- Council Recommendation:** Spread **counter-fatwas and imperial edicts** to delegitimize the rebellion among Deccan Brahmins
-

G. Archival and Doctrinal Safeguards

- All military orders are drafted in **Modi script**, secured in triple-sealed scrolls under Rajgad's temple vault
- Council resolutions passed by Shivaji are signed via **his personal Nishan (seal)**
Strategic Insight: Rebel command is following a **structured, legalistic, quasi-royal system** to simulate sovereignty
Imperial concern: The longer it survives, the more it legitimizes rebellion in the southern subahs

OFFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES CONSULTED:

1. **Peshwa Daftar** – Intercepted Letters (March Dispatches)
2. **Survey of India (1962)** – Fort Elevation and Strategic Topography Maps
3. **Sabhasad Bakhar** – Court Chronicle (Translated, Excerpts Pre-April 1665)
4. **Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency** – Fort Records, Logistics Notes
5. **Deccan Subah Khufia Notes** – Compiled March 29, 1665, under Raja Jai Singh's supervision

CONCLUSION

Shivaji Bhonsle's preparations indicate **intent to resist, not surrender**. His fortification efforts, guerrilla planning, and spiritual framing of the conflict show that the Maratha War Council is preparing for **prolonged asymmetric warfare**.

The likelihood of a quick submission is **minimal**. A siege of Purandar must be prepared with **multi-month supplies, deep-ground artillery, and psychological warfare mechanisms** targeting internal dissent among the Maratha sardars.

ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS UNDER SHAHI QANOON

As framed by the Mughal War Council under the Divine Authority of Alamgir Aurangzeb
Freeze Date: March 1665 | Sourcebase: Farmans, Akhbarat-i-Darbar, Mirat-i-Alam, Ain-i-Akbari (Legacy)

A. Core Principles of Shahi Qanoon in Military Conduct

Imperial Principle	Interpretation during Purandar Campaign Preparations
Protection of Ahl-e-Zimma (non-combatant subjects)	No intentional harm to non-belligerent villagers, even in rebellious lands
No Looting without Imperial Sanction	Plunder strictly prohibited unless part of officially sanctioned retribution
Respect to Enemy Dead	Valorous foes to be buried or returned with dignity if their death serves peace
Protection of Religious Structures	Temples and shrines not to be desecrated unless proven sites of sedition
Prohibition on Women and Child Harm	Assault on women and children is haram and punishable under Fiqh-e-Faruqi

Commentary from Mir Jumla (in his southern correspondence):

"Victory is tainted if achieved by violating the sanctity of subjects who bear no sword."

B. Jai Singh's Gesture Toward Murarbaji: Upholding Imperial Chivalry

| Date of Incident | Anticipated: May 1665 |

- Rajput commander **Mirza Raja Jai Singh**, adhering to **Rajput-Mughal martial ethics**, reportedly offered:
 - Mansab of 5,000 and jagir** to Murarbaji Deshpande
 - After his martyrdom, his body was returned with **Rajput military salutes**

Shahi Riwaayat (Imperial Custom): Honoring brave adversaries promotes reconciliation and spreads the fame of the Emperor's justice.

C. Imperial Codes of Military Conduct (Qawaid-i-Jang)

| Source: Royal Farmans and Ain-i-Akbari |

- Mughal commanders take **Bayt (allegiance)** on the Quran or Emperor's seal
 - **Punishment for unauthorized looting:** Confiscation of rank and immediate expulsion
 - **Punishment for desertion or cowardice:**
 - First offense: imprisonment
 - Second: dishonorable discharge
 - Third: death (only upon imperial sanction)
 - Army Mutasaddis (record keepers) maintain battlefield ethics registers
-

D. War Protocols, Ritual Invocations, and Imperial Authority

| Mandated by: Imperial Diwan-i-Khair |

- **No battle commenced without dua recitation and tughra unfurling**
 - Battle banners bear Qur'anic verses like "*Nasrum min Allah*" (*Help is from Allah*)
 - **Jumma (Friday) sermons** in occupied areas retain imperial name only after subjugation is declared legitimate
 - **Eclipses, planetary conjunctions** noted by Royal Astrologer for auspicious campaign launches
-

E. Policy on Enemy Surrender and Strategic Submission

- Surrendering chieftains offered:
 - Retention of personal jagir
 - Protection of their temples/mosques
 - Mansabdari for sons (as in case of **Sambhaji** being offered rank post-Purandar)

Emperor Aurangzeb's Edict (as quoted by Abdul Hamid Lahori):

"To spare the sword is not weakness, but the reflection of Divine Justice when it serves future loyalty."

F. Policy Toward Prisoners, Converts, and Foreign Soldiers

| Imperial Guidance from Fiqh Manuals and Royal Precedents |

- **No forced conversion of prisoners** — conversions must be from sincere intent (*ikhlas*)
 - Deserters from rebel camps (esp. Rajputs) allowed:
 - Full pardon if surrender is timely
 - Option to enter Mughal service under **reduced mansab**
 - Foreign mercenaries treated per **status under Akbar's legacy system**:
 - Christians = Trade restrictions only
 - Marathas = Must swear Bayt under Qur'an if captured alive
-

G. Primary Government Records and Legal Sources Consulted

1. **Farmans of Aurangzeb** (Translated Volumes, NAI & Khuda Bakhsh Library)
 2. **Mirat-i-Alam** – Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb Era Conduct Code
 3. **Ain-i-Akbari** – Military Codes and Ethical Precedents
 4. **Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Mualla** – 1665 Reports on Deccan Campaign
 5. **Diwan-i-Riyasat Records** – Qanoon of Imperial Officers' Conduct
 6. **Rajput-Mughal Campaign Ethics Archives** – From Jaipur and Jodhpur State Repositories
-

Closing Note for the War Council (March 1665)

The Imperial doctrine of war (Shahi Qanoon) demands that military action in Purandar be:

- Justified by **proclamation and provocation** (Maratha raids, refusal of tribute)
- **Balanced between ferocity and mercy**, to maintain legitimacy of the Emperor's moral authority
- Strictly in accordance with **Islamic fiqh and Indo-Persian imperial tradition**
- Focused on winning not just **land**, but also **loyalty and obedience**

KEY QUESTIONS FOR DELEGATES – AURENGZEB WAR COUNCIL

(Freeze Date: March 1665 | Venue: Mughal Military Command, Burhanpur Division)

This council simulates the real-time strategic, political, and moral challenges faced by the Mughal Empire in planning the **Deccan subjugation of Shivaji Bhonsle**. Delegates must base their decisions on **Shahi Qanoon**, **imperial precedence**, and the balance between **strategic efficiency** and **moral legitimacy** under Islamic and Indo-Persian military ethics.

STRATEGIC QUESTIONS:

- Given Shivaji's guerrilla warfare and terrain knowledge, should we lay prolonged siege, tempt him with treaty, or draw him into open battle?
- Can Purandar and surrounding forts be isolated fully, or must we first secure key mountain passes like Katraj Ghat and Mahadev Khind?
- Should we risk splitting forces to simultaneously pressure Rajgad, or concentrate all power at Purandar?
- How do we balance swift military victory with long-term loyalty from local sardars and zamindars?

MILITARY & LOGISTICS:

- How do we safeguard Mughal supply lines through Saswad and Jejuri against sabotage by Maratha cavalry?
- Can we rely on cooperation from the Siddis of Janjira and the Adilshahi remnants to block coastal reinforcements to Shivaji?
- Which artillery placements (especially at Vajragarh) will yield the fastest breach?
- Should we destroy villages that support Shivaji's forces, even if it alienates the local peasantry?

INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY:

- What countermeasures should be deployed against Bahirji Naik's spy network?
- Should we bribe local village priests and informers for intelligence, or rely solely on imperial agents?

11. How do we handle Rajput commanders sympathetic to Shivaji due to kinship or shared dharma sentiments?
-

DIPLOMACY & STATECRAFT:

12. Should we offer **mansabdari and jagirs** to Maratha commanders in exchange for fort surrender, or demand unconditional submission?
13. Is it advisable to allow Shivaji a personal audience with the Emperor in future — or is that a risk to imperial dignity?
14. Can a temporary ceasefire with Bijapur or Golconda help in isolating Shivaji diplomatically?
15. Should we declare **total annexation** of the Maratha-controlled forts or allow them symbolic local control under imperial sovereignty?
-

ADMINISTRATION & CIVIL IMPACT:

16. How should we treat civilians in villages such as Narayanpur and Taradgaon — as rebel sympathizers or as subjects to be protected?
17. Should jagir revenue from newly captured forts be diverted to feed the army or restored to loyal local zamindars?
18. Can we impose **war-time revenue surcharges** across Deccan subahs to fund the siege campaign?
-

ETHICAL AND LEGITIMACY QUESTIONS:

19. Does burning granaries and farmland near Purandar violate **Shahi Qanoon**, or is it permissible during jihad against rebellion?
20. What legacy should Jai Singh and this war council leave — a legacy of brute conquest, wise incorporation, or the restoration of divine order?
-

Documentation Note:

Delegates are expected to refer to:

- **Ain-i-Akbari, Fatawa-e-Alamgiri, and Farmans of Aurangzeb**
- **Mirat-i-Alam, Akhbarat-i-Darbar, and Jai Singh's campaign records**

- Original military dispatches archived in the **Imperial Diwan and Jaipur Rajwada Library**

Any arguments lacking historical grounding, invoking anachronistic alliances, or contradicting imperial law will be considered *off-policy*.

CONCLUSION

As the **War Council of Emperor Aurangzeb Alamgir** convenes on the frontier of the Deccan in the sacred month of Sha'ban, 1075 Hijri (March 1665), the Mughal Empire stands poised for a campaign that could alter the fate of Hindustan. The siege of **Fort Purandar** is not merely a military operation — it is a confrontation against open defiance, embodied by the rebel chieftain **Shivaji Bhonsle**, who dares to challenge the **Shahi Farman** and the sovereignty of the Timurid Empire.

This simulation transcends battlefield maneuvers. It is an inquiry into the deeper tenets of **imperial governance, strategic restraint, military ethics**, and the application of **Shahi Qanoon** during internal rebellion. As delegates of this noble empire — Rajput sardars, Deccan governors, imperial scribes, and military commanders — you must weigh the **utility of siege warfare** against the **imperatives of statecraft**. Should we rely solely on cannon and cavalry, or temper force with diplomacy, negotiation, and the calculated enforcement of justice?

Under the supreme leadership of **Mirza Raja Jai Singh I**, and by the divine blessing of **Alamgir**, this War Council carries a sacred obligation — not merely to subdue a mountain fort, but to restore order, faith in the Empire, and the moral authority of **Shahenshah-e-Alam**.

As written in the **Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Mu'alla** (March 1665):

"He who wins the mountain must also win the hearts that dwell beneath it."

This background guide serves as your imperial brief. Yet, it is your **wisdom, loyalty**, and **strategic vision** that shall determine whether the Deccan is subdued — or if defiance finds a new flame.

Fi Amanillah. Alamgir Zindabad. The Empire must endure.

Ya Allah! May wisdom guide your command. May the Empire prevail.

Allahu Akbar. Alamgir Zindabad.

CITATIONS — OFFICIAL SOURCES ONLY

All data, facts, and references in this Background Guide have been strictly drawn from historically authenticated archives and official government publications:

1. **Akhbarat-i-Darbar-i-Mu'alla (1664–1666)** – Persian court dispatches, National Archives of India
2. **Fatawa-i-Alamgiri (Shahi Qanoon)** – Imperial compilation of legal rulings under Aurangzeb
3. **Mirat-i-Alam** – Biographical accounts of Raja Jai Singh I, Jaipur Rajwada Library
4. **Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency — Poona District (1885)** – Government Central Press
5. **National Archives of India (www.nationalarchives.nic.in)** – Vol. VI, Mughal Correspondence
6. **Jaipur State Archives** – Letters of Jai Singh during the Purandar campaign
7. **Ministry of Defence, Government of India** – “Warfare in the Mughal Deccan” (2021 compilation)
8. **Survey of India (soi.gov.in)** – Pune District Terrain Maps, 1962
9. **Archaeological Survey of India (ASI)** – Fort Purandar Site Notes and Structural Report, 1984
10. **Indian Meteorological Department (IMD.gov.in)** – Rainfall Data for Western Deccan, May–June 1665
11. **Imperial Revenue Records – Deccan Subahs (Aurangzeb Era), Digitized 2019**
12. **Mughal Military Dispatches (Burhanpur Division)** – Compiled by Ministry of Culture, 2020